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ABSTRACT 
The two “pillars” on which taxable income is based are the definition of “gross income” in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, and the “general deduction formula” comprising 
the preamble to section 11, section 11(a) and section 23(g) of the Act.  Many of the terms used in 
these sections are not defined in the Income Tax Act.  Case law in relation to these sections 
reveals that morality issues, the negligence of taxpayers and the good faith of taxpayers have 
from time to time been treated as relevant considerations by the courts, both abroad and in South 
Africa, in allowing or disallowing deductions from the gross income of taxpayers.  In some 
instances this occurred apparently unwittingly.  In other instances, earlier decisions were 
followed without a thorough consideration of the correctness of the underlying reasoning or of 
the criteria which were applied in the earlier decisions. 
 
In relation to the definition of “gross income”, however, fides, mores and fault have not been a 
consideration.  In CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd 1918 TPD 391 Bristowe, J stated: “I do 
not think it is material for the purpose of this case whether the business carried on by the 
company is legal or illegal.”  There were a number of cases heard in relation to income from 
illegal activities (for example, COT v G, 1981 (4) SA 167 (ZA), 43 SATC 159, and ITC 291, 7 
SATC 335, which related to the misappropriation of funds, ITC 1545, 54 SATC 464, which dealt 
with the proceeds of the sale of stolen diamonds and ITC 1624, 59 SATC 373, which dealt with 
overcharging customers).  In these cases, the question turned on whether or not the amounts were 
received by the taxpayers for their own benefit and therefore to be included in gross income, or 
whether the taxpayers incurred a concomitant liability to repay the amounts, and did not involve 
the question of fides, mores or fault. 
 
The research concludes that, providing an even-handed approach is applied to both income and 
expense considerations,  fides and mores may continue to play a role as a useful yardstick in this 
context.  However, that fault, particularly the causal negligence of taxpayers in the process of 
sustaining a loss or incurring expenditure whilst conducting their income generating operations, 
has effectively been jettisoned as an irrelevant consideration, is a salutary development which 
has contributed to legal certainty. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 
 
CONTEXT 
The income tax payable by a taxpayer is based on “taxable income”, defined in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (referred to as “the Act”), as: 
 
 . . . the aggregate of: 
(a) the amount remaining after deducting from the income [own emphasis] of 
any person all the amounts allowed . . . to be deducted from or set off 
against such income . . .  
 
“Income”, in its turn, is defined in section 1 of the Act as: 
 
. . . the amount remaining of the gross income [own emphasis] of any person for 
any year or period of assessment after deducting therefrom any amounts exempt 
from normal tax . . .  
 
Certain amounts are exempt from normal tax on the basis of either the nature of the 
person (for example, public benefit organisations, the government and provincial 
or local authorities), or on the basis of the nature of the income (for example, 
disability pensions or grants or social pensions).  “Gross income” is defined in 
section 1 of the Act as: 
 
. . . the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of a resident [in the case of a non-resident, only amounts received or 
accruing from a source within, or deemed to be from a source within the 
Republic] . . ., excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature [which are 
included directly in taxable income] . . .  
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Allowable deductions are provided for in various sections of the Act, but the main 
sections governing deductibility are found in what is referred to as the “general 
deduction formula” comprising the preamble to section 11, section 11(a) and 
section 23 (g) of the Act, as follows: 
 
For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person 
from carrying on any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from the 
income of such person so derived – 
(a) expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income, 
provided such expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature; . . . 
(section 11(a)) 
 
No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, 
namely – 
(g) any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to 
the extent to which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the 
purposes of trade; . . .  (section 23) 
 
It is clear that the two “pillars” on which taxable income is based are the definition 
of “gross income” and the “general deduction formula”.  Many of the terms used 
in these sections are not defined in the Income Tax Act.  Case law interpretations 
of these sections reveals that morality issues, the negligence of taxpayers and the 
good faith of taxpayers have from time to time been treated as relevant 
considerations by the courts, both in England and South Africa, in allowing or 
disallowing deductions from the gross income of taxpayers.  In some instances this 
occurred apparently unwittingly.  In other instances, earlier decisions were 
followed without a thorough consideration of the correctness of the underlying 
reasoning or of the criteria which were applied in the earlier decisions. 
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Whilst the wording of the general deduction formula is contained in the Act, the 
definitions of the elements of the two subsections jointly comprising the general 
deduction formula are defined in such circumscribed or narrow a manner that a 
wider examination of the material facts is often inevitably necessary.  To determine 
whether the legal elements prescribed by these two subsections have been satisfied 
on the facts, the courts have over the years inter alia regarded the negligence of 
taxpayers in the conduct of their income generating operations as a relevant 
consideration, resulting in the disallowance of expenditure or losses claimed by 
them.  Some judgments reflect that public policy principles had influenced the 
reasoning of the judges, whether deliberately or as part of their motivation or 
reasoning advanced in support of their judgments.  The good faith of taxpayers has 
also been treated as a relevant consideration by the courts. Insofar as these 
concepts have been treated as relevant considerations, even though the general 
deduction formula itself does not render these concepts relevant per se, should this 
development be welcomed, or does it detract from legal certainty?  
 
In relation to the definition of “gross income”, however, fides, mores and fault 
have not been a consideration.  In CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd 1918 TPD 
391 Bristowe, J stated: 
 
I do not think it is material for the purpose of this case whether the business carried on by 
the company is legal or illegal.  Excess profits duty, like income tax, is leviable on all 
incomes exceeding the specified minimum . . .  The source of the income is immaterial. 
 
There were a number of cases heard in relation to income from illegal activities 
(for example, COT v G, 1981 (4) SA 167 (ZA), 43 SATC 159, and ITC 291, 7 
SATC 335, which related to the misappropriation of funds, ITC 1545, 54 SATC 
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464, which dealt with the proceeds of the sale of stolen diamonds and ITC 1624, 
59 SATC 373, which dealt with overcharging customers).  In these cases, the 
question turned on whether or not the amounts were received by the taxpayers for 
their own benefit and therefore to be included in gross income, or whether the 
taxpayers incurred a concomitant liability to repay the amounts, and did not 
involve the question of fides, mores or fault. 
 
In contrast, these questions formed the basis of many cases heard in relation to the 
deductibility of expenses.  Fides, or whether expenses were bona fide incurred for 
the purpose of the production of income, was an important consideration in Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co v CIR 1936 CPD 241.  The presence of 
negligence (or fault) denied a deduction for the payment of damages in Joffe & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR 1946 AD 157.  Deduction of the amounts paid as fines or penalties 
was denied on the basis that to allow such amounts to be deducted would be contra 
bonos mores (ITC 1490, 53 SATC 108). 
 
1.2 
 
GOAL OF THE RESEARCH 
The goal of the research is to establish whether or not mores, fault and fides are 
acceptable criteria to be applied when the granting of income tax deductions are 
considered?  In particular, the research aims to determine which of the concepts or 
considerations of mores, fault or fides should legitimately be regarded as relevant 
considerations and which of these concepts or considerations should have no role 
to play as measuring tools or criteria in allowing or disallowing deductions from 
the gross income of taxpayers. 
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The role played by these abstract, common law concepts during casuistic 
developments against the background of income tax legislation, is investigated, 
and the future role which might be played by these considerations, is assessed. 
 
1.3 
 
METHODS, PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
As a point of departure, the object of the taxation dispensation in South Africa is 
considered.  The approach to widen the tax net (on the receipt/accrual side), is 
contrasted with the approach which is followed when deductions are claimed.  The 
correctness of an approach which has allowed the introduction of moralistic, 
subjective or judgemental considerations, particularly on the deduction side, 
necessitates firstly, a review of the provisions of the Income Tax Act itself.  The 
Income Tax Act itself has to be reviewed to determine whether there are any 
express indications in the said Act regarding the question whether these 
considerations should play any part in determining whether expenditure or losses 
claimed as deductions should be permitted or not.  Moreover, the possible effect 
which the Constitution of South Africa may have, whether directly or indirectly, 
upon the issue as defined in the provisional title, is considered.  Once the content 
of the Income Tax Act itself has been considered, as well as the aforementioned 
contextual background, the reasoning which has been adopted over the years in 
case law is critically analysed.  The soundness of rationes adopted in earlier 
Southern African decisions are tested against logic, and contrasted against more 
recent decisions.  The role which these common law concepts should play, have to 
some extent been elucidated in more recent decisions.  Whilst it is understandable 
that the tax net should be widened as much as possible in South Africa, it may well 
be asked whether moralistic issues or human error should continue to disqualify 
actual expenditure or losses incurred, when morals, fault and fides apparently play 
no role on the accrual/receipt side? 
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The approach to this thesis therefore essentially entails an analytical and critical 
assessment of the soundness of this partly historic, partly ongoing casuistic 
development and the manner in which these abstract considerations or concepts 
have been applied in reported decisions. 
 
The reference framework includes a brief analysis of the purpose of taxation; the 
wording of the legislation, including the Act itself; the ad hoc treatment of these 
concepts in our case law and the gradual elucidation by the Courts of the roles 
which these concepts should play, if any, in the evaluation process.  
 
1.4 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
Chapter two briefly analyses the purpose of taxation.  It is recognized that the tax 
net should be cast as widely as possible to include all forms of income generated 
by the application of capital or labour, including the wits, skill and labour of the 
citizens of the Republic of South Africa, but questions whether deductions 
allowable against this income should be restricted by considerations of fault, fides 
or mores. 
 
Chapter three evaluates the relevant sections of the Act to determine whether the 
Act itself provides any express indiciae that community morals, good faith or fault 
are considerations when determining whether expenditure or losses are permitted 
as deductions from income.  The common law background and the current 
constitutional dispensation are also briefly considered. 
 
Chapter four discusses the role played by the courts in the Republic of South 
Africa, the erstwhile Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), England, Canada and the United 
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States of America in establishing the principles of mores, fides and fault as relevant 
considerations when allowing deductions against income, for tax purposes. 
 
Chapter five concludes the thesis, summarising the principles established during 
the research process and assesses the continuing relevance of the considerations of 
mores, fides and fault in the revenue to be included in taxable income and the 
deductions allowable against income in arriving at the taxable income on which 
normal tax is levied. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  THE PURPOSE OF TAXATION 
In this thesis, the relevance of fault, fides and mores, in the context of the 
deductibility of expenditure or losses, is investigated.  If these concepts or criteria 
are deemed to be relevant, is it permissible that they are only regarded to be of 
relevance when consideration is given to the question whether certain receipts or 
accruals should fall in the tax net, or should the same criteria not be similarly 
relevant when the deductibility of expenditure incurred or losses sustained, is 
evaluated?  This thesis considers to what extent these criteria and principles of 
policy have been regarded as relevant by the courts over the years, from a critical 
perspective.  Whether the criteria have been applied consistently, both on the 
accrual/receipt side and on the deduction side, is also considered.  Whether the 
approach is correct to treat fault, fides and mores as relevant criteria, is also 
investigated. 
 
2.1 
 
FUNDING STATE EXPENDITURE 
As a point of departure, it is necessary to consider the object or purpose of 
taxation. Taxes provide income for the government to manage society and to 
provide essential services for the inhabitants of the country.  The levying of taxes 
requires a balancing act, because the income generating activities of the residents 
are directly affected by the imposition of taxes.  The fiscus should not make too 
drastic inroads upon the daily income earning activities of society, yet should 
collect sufficient taxes from society to ensure that the budgetary requirements of 
the government of the day are met.  This is particularly apposite in the South 
African situation, where the trading account balance (that is, the difference 
between exports and imports) is more readily affected by macro-economic factors 
than the trade balances of countries with larger economies, or countries which 
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function within a trading block with one common denominator, such as those 
countries which form part of the European Union. 
 
Tax has a direct effect upon a taxpayer:  the taxpayer’s disposable income is 
reduced, resulting in a reduction in his available income to spend on necessary 
services, but also on products generated by society.  The levying of taxes has the 
effect that the taxpayer has less disposable funds to spend on the daily social needs 
of his family, to save for possible ill health, incapacity or for retirement and 
accordingly not only has a personal effect, but also has a collective effect on 
society.  
 
Collected taxes are, to a certain extent, ploughed back into society.  Infrastructural 
spending usually has direct and indirect benefits, inter alia upon the employment 
of residents who are remunerated, which remuneration is then partly ploughed 
back into the economy through consumer spending and so forth. In theory, 
permanent jobs are also created by the need to maintain existing facilities and 
infrastructure. Taxes are also used for the creation and maintenance of systems 
which are necessary for the operation of society, such as transport systems (road; 
rail; air);  telecommunication (post;  telephone;  radios);  the provision and 
maintenance of security and control (defence forces;  police and traffic police).    
 
2.2 
 
THE TAX BASE 
Nonetheless, the government must always keep in mind the relatively narrow tax 
base of taxpayers in South Africa, compared to the total population of South 
Africa. The 2006 mid-year population was estimated at approximately 47.4 million 
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individuals.1  There are 1 276 157 active registered close corporations and 415 990 
active registered companies in South Africa.2 According to an official publication 
of the South African Revenue Service3
 
 there were 4.86 million individual 
registered taxpayers in South Africa registered for the 2005/06 financial year. The 
Revenue Office (with 14 800 employees) had processed 14.8 million returns in 
total.  Of particular relevance is the inevitable question:  who are in the tax 
network and who are outside the tax network?  Should a tax system act as a 
stimulus, for example to enhance the standard of living of society?  Should it 
merely be a passive mechanism, for example a mechanism utilised to simply 
collect enough money to meet necessary expenses?  Should it rather be aimed at 
ameliorating the inherently unfair concept of taking money away from the public 
by way of forced payments, collected on a rigid tariff or scale, without any option 
on the part of taxpayers to pay?  Is this idea of amelioration the reason why 
deductions from the taxable income of taxpayers are allowed? The underlying 
rationale for the allowance of deductions could also be explained by ascribing it to 
the realisation that economic activity should be stimulated, rather than stifled, by a 
successful tax system.  The “carrot-in-front-of-your-nose” approach then goes 
hand in hand with the amelioration concept (“we feel sorry for you”).  The 
allowing of deductions may also be perceived as a form of a reward for the income 
generator (“well done, you have generated so much, you are now entitled to some 
money back for your efforts!”).   
The analysis of the make-up of the South African taxpayer base is of relevance to 
the topic under discussion.  It could be asked: In what way?  It might be contended 
                                            
1 Executive Summary, approved by Pali J Lehohla, Statistician-General, 27 July 2006.  
   www.statssa.gov.za.  Statistics South Africa. 
 
2 Media Statement, 23 May 2005. Cape Town: www.sars.gov.za.   
 
3 SARS Annual Report 2005/06 (HTML Version), SARS at a Glance. February 2006.     
www.sars.gov.za.  
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that in modern day society, neither fault nor morality should constitute factors 
relevant in determining which persons fall within the tax net, and which persons 
fall outside the tax net; who have to pay taxes and who are exempt; and what 
should be the extent of the taxes which have to be paid.  However, these two 
factors or considerations have often been treated as relevant in certain scenarios.  
This assertion will be demonstrated by referring to the casuistic development in 
South African courts over the years.  
 
The calculated widening of the tax net is a realistic and common sense objective of  
the fiscus. A typical example is the current tax amnesty which is being offered to 
small businesses in South Africa.  That this approach is sound, is self-evident:  
South Africa has a small tax base compared to its total population, whilst the socio-
economic health, welfare and developmental demands of the South African society 
are massive. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) in South Africa currently amounts 
to R 418,116 billion per year4.  Gross domestic expenditure has consistently 
exceeded gross domestic product over the last two years, and the current account 
of the balance of payments has recorded a deficit over the ten past completed 
quarters, at the end of the 2005 fiscal year.5
 
  The demands of society clearly cannot 
be met simply by income generated from exports and imports, or from 
international trade.  The imposition of taxes is essential to balance the books of the 
South African fiscus. 
At the commencement of the twentieth century, Africa was largely undeveloped, 
save for certain exceptions in the North, the extreme South and certain ports in 
Western and Eastern Africa.  Europe was substantially developed and more 
                                            
4  Press statement by the Minister of Finance, Trevor A Manuel on the Preliminary Revenue Results  
    for the Fiscal Year 2005/2006. www.sars.gov.za. The amount mentioned was the total at midnight on   
    31 March 2006. 
 
5  Annual Report. Revenue Collection. www.sars.gov.za. 
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advanced, as were certain parts of the East.  The New World was developing 
rapidly.  Within a century, Africa, and for purposes of this project, South Africa, is 
nonetheless expected to compete on the international trade market. Whilst the 
population of South Africa has grown steadily since the nineteen-hundreds, 
unfortunately, primarily by reason of political and socio-economic policies which 
were followed and enforced, the development of the individual, intellectual ability 
of all citizens, was not a priority.  Particularly the neglect or suppression of 
education standards of the blacks, which predictably led to group resistance and the 
development of a protest-society, was hardly conducive to the development of 
hard-working, wealth aspiring and hence, income generating taxpayers.  The 
development of entrepreneurial skills and financial self-dependence amongst 
potential taxpayers was not prioritised.  
 
Whilst the extent and total sum of taxes collected by the South African Revenue 
Services has over the last few years exceeded all expectations, the demand for 
essential State expenditure has not subsided.  One only has to cite the lack of 
available funds to address the aids pandemic as an example, which is already 
identifiable as a silent strangler of economic growth.  Infrastructural spending on 
hospitals is clearly required, as is the case with respect to inadequate transport 
systems and networks. 
 
The relevance of this socio-economic and political background lies herein:  in 
considering the research topic, the harsh South African reality should not and 
cannot be ignored.  On the one hand, care must be taken not to tax the registered 
tax base unduly.  On the other hand, the tax net should be widened rather than 
narrowed.  Once the taxpayer or entity finds himself, herself or itself within or 
under the net, then the question arises:  should moralistic issues or value judgments 
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play a part when relief is offered to the entrapped taxpayers in the net by way of 
deductions, or should it not play any part? 
 
Does the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the “Income Tax 
Act”), through its non-moralistic formulation of the accrual and receipt concepts 
and the definition of “gross income” (in section 1), not implicitly suggest that the 
net should as far as possible be spanned indiscriminately over taxpayers:  whether 
they are preachers, prostitutes, bankers or loan sharks (not used synonymously);  
doctors and sangomas (traditional healers), assuming the differentiation remains 
valid;  cricket players, match-fixers and gamblers? If an inner city sangoma, or 
downtown scheming bookmaker, are welcomed as competent taxpayers under the 
tax net:  can the sangoma not claim a travel deduction for having collected his muti 
(herbs, plants and other ingredients of traditional medicine) somewhere in the hills 
of his hinterland?  Can the bookmaker not claim the actual cost to him, of the 
bottles of single malt whiskey which he regularly bestows upon trainers, team 
managers or team captains for “inside” information?  If not, why not?  And what 
about the costs incurred by the loan-shark who regularly treats department heads 
and employers on lavish lunches, should he not be allowed the benefit of direct, 
electronic loan repayments by way of deductions from employees’  salaries?  
Where should the line (or lines) be drawn?  Do societal values not inescapably 
come into the equation?  If so, in which manner, or under what guise?  Is it not 
inevitable that societal mores will permeate the legal adjudication process, whether 
through canons of construction, guidelines of interpretation or by way of the 
application of substantive common law legal principles, or in some other way?  
And what about fault?  If a taxpaying company generates its income by offering 
high risk adventure activities, such as bungee-jumping, rafting, scuba-diving or 
flights by micro-light, should losses actually sustained or damages claims actually 
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paid by such company, be disallowed simply because the company was negligent, 
perhaps even grossly negligent in the process?   
 
The need to broaden the tax base in order to raise the tax revenue to be used to 
meet the social-economic needs of the country would suggest that all types of 
revenue-generating activities should fall within the tax net, irrespective of 
questions of morality or legality.  Once within the tax net, the question can be 
asked whether societal values or norms should be used to decide whether or not 
expenditure incurred in producing the revenue should be disallowed as deductions 
in arriving at taxable income. 
 
2.3 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
It will be shown in this thesis that the Income Tax Act itself does not provide any 
clear-cut answers to the topic under discussion.  The courts are usually primarily 
concerned with interpretational issues within a specific statutory context.  More 
often than not, the courts have to decide whether the language of the Income Tax 
Act allows a particular deduction or not.  The broader, quasi-philosophical or 
theoretical questions usually do not have to be addressed.  Not surprisingly, a 
rather mechanistic approach is usually followed.  Admittedly, our courts are not 
supposed to fulfil the role of academics or economists and do not unnecessarily 
become embroiled in theoretical issues, particularly when the applicability of a 
statute is at stake. Nonetheless, the courts have postulated various tests or criteria 
over the years which have inter alia involved principles of morality, fides and 
fault, which are then used to evaluate whether certain expenditures which have 
been incurred, should be allowed as deductions or not.  How satisfactory are these 
tests or criteria which have, directly or indirectly (or intentionally or 
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unintentionally) involved mores, fault and fides?  This vexed question is discussed 
in the chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  INDICATORS IN THE INCOME TAX ACT 
The concepts of mores and fault are notoriously difficult to define.  Fault is largely 
a common law concept, involving a subjective element, but calling for an objective 
assessment of the “directing intention” or “mind” of the subject under evaluation.  
The mores of a taxpaying community does not entail a static concept – it is 
invariably a dynamic concept which fluctuates and evolves as the community 
changes and develops.  In South Africa, the community mores are no longer 
assessed in the abstract, simply by way of an “armchair approach” of a judge 
(whose own personal background, training and beliefs might differ materially from 
the beliefs of his brethren or those held by the general public), but are measured 
against, if not determined by, the Constitution.6  However, the community mores 
also constitute a well-known common law concept.  In the pre-constitutional era, 
contracts or arrangements which infringed upon the good morals or values held by 
society were held to be unenforceable.7
 
 
3.1 
 
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES 
Before the Income Tax Act itself is evaluated to determine whether any express 
indiciae are provided in the Act regarding the question whether the good morals of 
a community, or fault (dolus or culpa) should play any part in determining whether 
expenditure or losses claimed as deductions, should be permitted or not, it is 
important to refer to the broader, principled common law background and the 
current constitutional dispensation.  In the constitutional era, a constant re-
assessment of existing common law principles is necessary, to ensure that common 
law principles remain congruent with the principles enshrined in the Constitution.   
                                            
6 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
 
7 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
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In the constitutional setting, all statutory provisions are subject to the supremacy of 
the Constitution.   
 
At common law, the question whether any particular conduct or arrangement was 
contra bonos mores usually required an assessment of the particular contextual 
setting of the conduct or arrangement in issue.  This is apparent from the judgment 
in Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A), at 1025 – 1026, where the following self-
explanatory passage appears: 
 
Although the phrase contra bonos mores is ordinarily used with reference to conduct 
which is regarded as immoral or sexually reprehensible, it really has a far wider meaning 
(cf Grotius 3.1.42-43, Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1.14.2;  Aquilius 
“Immorality and Illegality in Contract” 1941 SAL vol 58 at 337).  Mores or boni mores 
(Dutch:  “zeden” or “goede zeden”;  English:  “morals” or “morality” and Afrikaans:  
“sedes” or “goeie sedes”) can be defined as meaning 
“the accepted customs and usages of a particular social group that are usually morally binding 
upon all members of the group and are regarded as essential to its welfare and preservation” 
(see Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary sv “mos”;  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language sv “mores”;  
Oxford English Dictionary sv “moral and morality”;  Van Dale Groot Woordeboek der 
Nederlandse Taal sv “zede”;  Kritzinger and Labuschagne Verklarende Afrikaanse 
Woordeboek sv “sede”;  and Seedat’s case supra at 309 where Innes CJ refers to the 
“principles and institutions” of our society). I would not regard a polygamous union 
solemnised under the tenets of the Muslim faith, and the customs related thereto, as being 
contra bonos mores, in the narrower sense in which the expression is ordinarily used, ie 
as immoral (see Ngqobela v Sihele (supra at 352) and Docrat v Bhayat (supra at 127)), 
but such a union can be regarded as being contra bonos mores in the wider sense of the 
phrase, ie as being contrary to the accepted customs and usages which are regarded as 
morally binding upon all members of the society or, as Innes CJ said in Seedat’s case at 
309 “as being fundamentally opposed to our principles and institutions”. 
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The Constitution not only has a direct effect upon the State, its organs and citizens, 
but also has an indirect or so-called “radiating” effect upon legal relationships in a 
democratic society.  In Napier v Barkhuizen8 the Supreme Court of Appeal made 
it clear9
 
 that the Constitution and its value system do not confer on Judges a 
general jurisdiction to declare contracts invalid because of what they perceive as 
unjust.  Cameron JA also emphasised that judges do not have the power to decide 
that contractual terms cannot be enforced on the basis of “imprecise notions of 
good faith”. Yet, it was emphasised that courts will invalidate agreements 
offensive to public policy, and will refuse to enforce agreements that seek “to 
achieve objects offensive to public policy”.  The said Cameron JA continued:   
Crucially, in this calculus ‘public policy’ now derives from the founding constitutional 
values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.10
 
 
If one accordingly has regard to the Income Tax Act itself, particularly to the 
question whether specific expenditure which was incurred in an alleged “trade”, 
(whether perceived to be of a dubious nature or not) should be allowed or not, the 
answer may be affected by the “radiating” effect of the Constitution.  
Consequently, whilst certain expenditure might not have been admissible as a 
deduction twenty or thirty years ago, it is conceivably possible that by reason of 
the new constitutional values, such expenditure may now constitute a legally 
permissible deduction.  In particular, the Constitution emphasises principles of 
equality, freedom of activity (subject to the limitation clause) as well as tolerance 
and accommodation of individuals.    
                                            
8 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
 
9 In paragraph 7 on page 6 of the judgment. 
 
10 Paragraph 7 on page 7 at B of the judgment. 
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3.2 
 
THE INCOME TAX ACT 
Not surprisingly, the Income Tax Act itself does not contain any direct reference to 
the fault-concept. Fault remains largely a well-established, common law concept.  
By its very nature, the “mores”-concept is not readily defined in statutes, with the 
exception of the Constitution, which contains certain fundamental rights and 
minimum community values. The present Income Tax Act (58 of 1962) 
consolidated the income tax legislation dating from 1941 to 1961.  The Income 
Tax Act, as amended, not only levies income tax (including Secondary Tax on 
Companies), but also donations tax11 and capital gains tax.12
 
  The income tax 
payable by a taxpayer is based on “taxable income”, defined in section 1 of the Act 
as: 
 . . . the aggregate of: 
(b) the amount remaining after deducting from the income [own emphasis] of 
any person all the amounts allowed . . . to be deducted from or set off 
against such income . . .  
 
“Income”, in its turn, is defined in section 1 of the Act as: 
 
. . . the amount remaining of the gross income [own emphasis] of any person for 
any year or period of assessment after deducting therefrom any amounts exempt 
from normal tax . . .  
 
Certain amounts are exempt from normal tax on the basis of either the nature of the 
person (for example, public benefit organisations, the government and provincial 
                                            
11  Donations tax is levied in terms of Part V of the Income Tax Act. 
 
12  Capital gains tax and losses are determined in the manner as is prescribed in the Eighth Schedule to  
     the Income Tax Act. 
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or local authorities), or on the basis of the nature of the income (for example, 
disability pensions or grants or social pensions).  “Gross income” is defined in 
section 1 of the Act as: 
 
. . . the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of a resident [in the case of a non-resident, only amounts received or 
accruing from a source within, or deemed to be from a source within the 
Republic] . . ., excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature [which are 
included directly in taxable income] . . .  
 
Receipts or accruals are either of an income or capital nature.13
 
 This distinction, as 
well as the various instances of exempt income specified in the Act, are not 
considered in this thesis. Private or household expenses are very real expenses in 
daily life, which are undoubtedly “actually” incurred by all and sundry.  However, 
section 23(a) and section 23(b) make it clear that the costs of maintaining “any 
taxpayer, his family or establishment” as well as “domestic or private expenses” 
are not allowed as deductions. 
The phrase “carrying on any trade” forms the core element of section 11(a).  
Section 11(a) provides as follows: 
 
For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person 
from carrying on any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from the 
income of such person so derived – 
(b) expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income, 
provided such expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature; . . .  
 
                                            
13   “There is no half-wayhouse” vide:  Pyott Ltd v CIR 1945 AD 128 at 135. 
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For purposes of determining the taxable income derived by a taxpayer from 
carrying on any trade,14
 
 before one has regard to the individual elements contained 
in section 11(a) of the Act, the question therefore needs to be asked:  what does the 
concept “trade” entail?  “Trade” is defined as follows: 
‘trade’ includes every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or 
venture, including the letting of any property and the use of the grant of permission to use 
any patent as defined in the Patents Act, 1978 (Act 57 of 1978), or any design as defined 
in the Designs Act, 1993 (Act 195 of 1993), or any trade mark as defined in the Trade 
Marks Act, 1993 (Act 194 of 1993), or any copyright as defined in the Copyright Act, 
1978 (Act 98 of 1978), or any other property which is of a similar nature. 
 
It is clear from this definition that it is a wide concept which has not been 
exhaustively defined (this is apparent from the use of the word “includes”).  In 
Burgess v CIR 1993 (4) SA 161 (A), the Appellate Division held that if a taxpayer 
pursues a course of conduct which constitutes the carrying on of a trade, the 
taxpayer would not cease to be carrying on such trade merely because one of the 
taxpayer’s purposes, or even his main purpose, in doing what he does, is to obtain 
some tax advantage;  if he carries on a trade, his motive for doing so is irrelevant.  
Thus, the test is essentially one of fact. The definition should not be interpreted 
restrictively, but should rather be given the widest possible interpretation.  The 
trade may even be carried on in the knowledge that losses may result.15
 
   
On the income or revenue side, the Act does not provide express indications that 
the common law concepts of mores, fault and fides are of relevance in evaluating 
                                            
14   As defined in section 1 of the Act.  There is allowed as a deduction from the income so derived   
     “expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income, provided such expenditure and    
      losses are not of a capital nature”. 
 
15 CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A). 
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whether receipts of accruals constitute gross income.  As will be shown below, 
particularly in respect of the so-called theft cases, issues of moral turpitude and 
fides have had to be considered on evaluating the question whether proceeds from 
dubious sources or origin constitute gross income.  However, fault, particularly 
negligence, is usually entirely irrelevant on the revenue side.  If certain activities 
prima facie generated receipts or accruals of a revenue nature, this will prima facie 
have to be accounted for as gross income. The “gross income” definition contains a 
generalised widely formulated introductory part and “without in any way limiting 
the scope of this definition” identifies numerous specific receipts or accruals which 
also fall under the definition of “gross income”, namely in subparagraphs (a) to 
(m) of the definition of “gross income”. 
 
Insofar as the legislature has used the words “cash or otherwise”, this is a clear 
indication that a disclosed benefit which may be turned into money, or has a value 
in money, will also constitute income.  The definition does not exclude receipts, 
whether “cash or otherwise”, or accruals of an illegal or unlawful nature.  To the 
contrary, ex facie the wording of the Act, the definition would be operative 
irrespective of the fact that the proceeds are derived from an activity, business or 
scheme which is unlawful or in contravention of a specific prohibition.  This 
approach is born out by the decisions in CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Company 
Ltd 1918 TPD 319, and Morrison v CIR 1950 (2) SA 449 (A), which decisions are 
discussed in chapter four of this thesis.   
 
The definition of “gross income” in section 1 of the Income Tax Act is a lengthy 
one.  However, the definition provides little or no indication of the possible 
relevance of the mores-concept, or of the possible relevance of fault.  The amount 
of gross income which is received by, or has accrued to a resident, whether in cash 
or otherwise, constitutes the resident’s gross income.  In the case of any person 
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other than a resident, the total amount in cash or otherwise received by or accrued 
to, or in favour of such person from a source within or deemed to be within the 
Republic, constitutes gross income.  Receipts or accruals of a capital nature are 
excepted.  However, amounts which are received irrespective of whether the 
amounts are of a capital nature or not, as described in paragraphs (a) – (n) of the 
definition, are included in the concept of gross income.  Ex facie the Income Tax 
Act, an objective, factual inquiry is called for to determine whether expenditure or 
losses incurred constitute permissible deductions in terms of the Act, in terms of     
section 11(a) as read with section 23(g) of the Act.  It is during the interpretation 
process, and the application in particular factual settings of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act, that principles of morality, fides and the fault concepts might 
become, or have already been regarded, as being of relevance. 
 
Allowable deductions are provided for in various specific sections of the Act.  The 
main sections of the Act which govern deductibility are found in what is referred to 
as the “general deduction formula”, comprising the preamble to section 11,    
section 11(a), already quoted above, and section 23(g) of the Act.  Section 23(g) of 
the Act provides as follows: 
 
No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, 
namely – 
(h) any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to 
the extent to which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the 
purposes of trade; . . .  (section 23) 
 
Neither the word “expenditure”, nor the word “losses” have been defined in   
section 1 of the Act. Meyerowitz16
                                            
16 Meyerowitz, D. (2005, 2006 Ed) Meyerowitz on Income Tax.  Cape Town:  The Taxpayer,     
, paragraph 11.31, correctly contends that the 
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distinction between the two words is of no particular importance in relation to 
deductions.  Emphasis must be placed on the word “any”, which precedes the 
concepts “expenditure and losses”. The manner in which the expenditure or losses 
were incurred, prima facie appear to be irrelevant, as long as the expenditure and 
losses were actually incurred.  The legislature did not state that the expenditure or 
loss should have been incurred in a profit generating trade, or by an efficient 
business.  To the contrary, as long as the expenditure or losses were actually 
incurred, it would prima facie meet the requirement postulated by section 11(a) of 
the Income Tax Act.  This requirement is particularly relevant to the topic under 
consideration.  
 
Before any deduction of expenditure or losses may be allowed, such expenditure or 
losses should have been incurred “in the production of income”, as defined.  The 
corollary to section 11(a) is section 23(g), which provides expressly that no 
deduction of any monies is admissible which have not been laid out or expended 
“for the purposes of trade”.  Both requirements must accordingly be satisfied.  It 
has already been pointed out above that the expenditure may still qualify as a 
deduction, even though the taxpayer does not expect to make a profit in regard to a 
particular expenditure.  However, in such an event, the taxpayer will have to 
establish that the expenditure incurred was so connected with the pursuit of the 
taxpayer’s trade, to justify the conclusion that despite the lack of profit motive, the 
monies paid out under the transaction were expended for the purposes of trade.17
 
   
The requirement that a particular expense or loss should have been incurred “in the 
production of the income” has been further interpreted and “fleshed out” by the 
                                                                                                                                            
   paragraph 11.31. 
 
17 De Beer’s Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (A). 
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Courts.  Three well-known, and often quoted, decisions are of particular relevance 
to the topic of this dissertation, namely:  
 
   Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Limited v CIR 1936 CPD 241, 
 
  Joffe & Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1946 (AD) 157, 
 
  Sub-Nigel Limited v CIR 1948 (4) SA 580 (A). 
 
In the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Limited decision,        
Watermeyer AJP expressed the view that the nexus between the expenditure and 
the act concerned will be sufficiently close if the expenses had been incurred as 
part of the performance of a business operation bona fide conducted for the 
purpose of earning income.  Such expenditures would be deductible, provided they 
are so closely connected with the required purpose, that the expenditure or loss 
may be regarded as part of the cost of performing it.  Neither fault nor the mores of 
the community were identified as being relevant criteria, but fides, particularly 
bona fides in the sense as used above, was elected as the yardstick.  This decision 
is further evaluated below.  In the Joffe decision, Watermeyer, now CJ, stated that 
the expenditure, or the act which gave rise to the expenditure, had to be a 
“necessary concomitant” of the business operation.  Upon a careful reading of this 
judgment, it is clear that the fault of the taxpayer, a construction company, which 
negligently caused the death of workman through faulty construction, did play a 
decisive role in the judgment.  Watermeyer CJ implicitly did regard fault as a 
relevant criterion in assessing whether the particular expenditure was deductible.  
On the facts, he held that his newly postulated test was not satisfied, as there was 
insufficient evidence to show that the taxpayer’s method of conducting its business 
necessarily led to accidents.   
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In the Sub-Nigel decision, supra, a more factual or objective criterion was applied.  
It was held that expenditure actually incurred would still qualify as a deduction, 
even though no income was produced.  Provided that the expenditure was incurred 
“for the purpose of earning income” the requirement could be satisfied.    
 
The last element of section 11(a) provides that the expenditure and losses are not 
allowed if such expenditure and losses are of a capital nature.  This requirement is 
of lesser relevance to the topic under discussion.   
 
Section 23(d) expressly forbids the deduction of any tax, duty, levy, interest or 
penalty imposed under the Act, any additional tax imposed under section 60 of the 
Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991, any interest or penalty payable in consequence 
of the late payment of any tax, duty, levy or contribution imposed in terms of 
specific enactments. In this respect, the negligence or perhaps the deliberate default 
of taxpayers are directly addressed.  
 
The mores of the community, as well as policy principles, clearly played a role in 
the introduction of section 23(o), which came into effect from 1 January 2006 and 
which provides as follows: 
  
 23 No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, namely –  
  
 (o) any expenditure incurred –  
(i) where the payment of that expenditure or the agreement or offer to make 
that payment constitutes an activity contemplated in Chapter 2 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No 12 of 
2004);  or 
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(ii) which constitutes a fine charged or penalty imposed as a result of an 
unlawful activity carried out in the Republic or in any other country if that 
activity would be unlawful had it been carried out in the Republic. 
 
The prohibition in section 23(o)(i) might be regarded as being superfluous, in the 
light thereof that the contra bonos mores principle should stand in the way of any 
deduction claimed of the nature as specified.  Quite understandably, the legislature, 
however, wanted to leave no room for any doubt to prevail in this regard, by 
inserting this particular subsection. 
 
The wording of section 23(o)(ii) is significant.  It should be noted that only a 
“charged fine” or a “penalty imposed” are specified.  The subsection does not refer 
to any other expenditure which might otherwise have been actually incurred in the 
process of conducting an unlawful business or “trade”.  It would have been a 
simple matter for the legislature to have expressly ruled out an unlawful activity or 
business as constituting a “trade” for purposes of the Act.  This has not occurred.  
Hence, it is submitted that in terms of ordinary principles of interpretation, insofar 
as only “fines charged ” or “penalties imposed ” have been referred to, that other 
expenditure or losses which were actually incurred “in the production of income” 
and which are not of a capital nature, but which otherwise meet the legal 
requirements, are still claimable, irrespective of the fact that such expenditure or 
losses may have been incurred during the course of an unlawful activity.   
 
The interpretation of the concepts “a fine charged ” or “penalty imposed ” (“as a 
result of an unlawful activity”) in section 23(o)(ii) will foreseeably result in future 
court disputes.  None of the individual words – which all appear to have a 
relatively straightforward meaning when used independently or separately – are 
defined in section 1 of the Act.  Contextually, what is the meaning of the concept 
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“a fine charged ” and which meaning should be given to “a penalty imposed ”?  Is 
a formal process and specifically a court process presupposed, or not? 
 
The word “charged ” seemingly suggests some form of a formal indictment, but 
not necessarily an actual conviction.  It was held in Bate v Regional Magistrate, 
Randburg 1996 (7) BCLR 974 (W), that the word as used in section 25(3) of the 
1993 Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), is not restricted to the official notification 
given to an accused by a competent authority, but the word used in that context 
relates to an arrested person’s right to be charged or informed of the reason for his 
detention. A more narrow interpretation of the word, used in the same context as 
mentioned before, was given by the court in Du Preez v Attorney-General, 
Eastern Cape [1997] 1 All SA 713 (E).  It was held that the plain meaning of the 
word refers to a “formal accusation upon which a person is brought to trial ” and 
that a person is only so “charged ” when informed that a competent authority has 
decided to prosecute him.  
 
Two rules of interpretation may come into the equation during the interpretation 
process.  The contra fiscum rule may come into conflict with the so-called 
“mischief rule”. The contra fiscum rule represents an interpretational aid in the 
event of the ambiguity of a statutory provision which makes inroads on the rights 
of the individual. In such an event, the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the 
individual (or taxpayer) whose rights are thereby diminished.  The “mischief rule” 
applies to any statutory provision designed to suppress a particular form of 
mischief which the legislature perceives as harmful to the public interest (see:  
Steyn, L.C, (Fifth Edition). Die Uitleg van Wette, chapter II, page 22 and 
further). 
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It is submitted that the intention of the legislature is at least clear in one material 
respect:  only specific “fines” and specific “penalties” which were “charged ” or 
“imposed ” as a result of unlawful activities are prohibited.  The deduction of all 
“fines” and all “penalties” are not so prohibited.  The particular “fine” or “penalty” 
(which words themselves are also open to more than one meaning) should 
constitute a fine or penalty of a specific nature, namely the fine should have been 
“charged ” and the penalty should have been “imposed ”, not for any general 
reason, but specifically “as a result of an unlawful activity”. It is submitted that the 
lastmentioned words suggest that some adjudicator or judicial body should have 
concluded or have arrived at a finding that a “fine” had to be “charged ” or that a 
“penalty” had to be “imposed ” as a result of an unlawful activity as envisaged.  
Should the adjudicating body responsible for the imposition of the penalty or the 
charging of the fine, be a court of law, or is this not necessary?  It may further be 
questioned whether the payment of a fine or a penalty consequent upon the receipt 
of a written demand or notice (for example, the notification of an alleged offence 
completed by an official on a pre-printed form or summons) would bestow upon 
such fine or penalty the status of being a “fine charged ” or a “penalty imposed ”?   
 
More than a hundred years ago, Field J held, in the (English) decision of R v 
D’Eyncourt (1888) 21 QBD 109 at 119, DC, as follows:             
  
I am of the opinion that the word “charged ” must be read in its known legal sense, 
namely, the solemn act of calling before a magistrate an accused person and stating, in 
his hearing, in order that he may defend himself, what is the accusation against him.      
 
The involvement of a court was therefore required in such context in which the 
word “charged ” was used, even at the preliminary stage, before any adjudication 
process had taken place. 
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The ordinary meaning of the word “fine” is that a fine is a financial penalty which 
is imposed for a crime that has been committed.  The legislature created this form 
of punishment mainly as a punishment for lesser offences and as an alternative to 
imprisonment.  The purpose of a fine is to be found in the fact that it punishes the 
offender without detaining him. It is usually imposed with alternative 
imprisonment, in other words imprisonment which becomes operative upon failure 
to pay the fine (see:  Du Toit, E, et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act: Cape Town, Juta, particularly the commentary on section 287). 
 
A penalty, the amount of which was arbitrarily fixed by an official after the 
contravention of a regulatory by-law (which may well constitute an unlawful 
activity), does not in the view of the writer constitute a penalty “imposed” as a 
result of an unlawful activity, within the meaning of section 23(o)(ii) of the Act.  In 
the context of section 23(o)(ii), a formal court process is in the view of the writer 
contemplated, resulting in the imposition of the penalty.  It is accordingly 
submitted that in the context of section 23(o)(ii), the penalty which is being 
contemplated, is not merely a penalty which may have been imposed by an 
administrative official, but a penalty which was imposed by a court of law.  
 
Especially in the light of the material fact that the legislature did not prohibit the 
deduction of all fines and all penalties relating to, or in connection with, unlawful 
activities generally, a narrow and technical interpretation of these concepts are in 
the writer’s view called for, particularly as they appear in a revenue statute. It is 
submitted that a court, or at least an official judicial tribunal, must first be 
interposed to decide upon the link with the unlawful activity, whereafter the 
contemplated fine should be “charged” or the penalty be “imposed”.   
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That a causal nexus must have been found to exist “resulting in” the “fine charged” 
or the imposition of the penalty, is a further necessary element which must be 
satisfied, before this particular statutory prohibition of deductions of this nature, is 
activated.  
 
In principle therefore, as long as the business or activity which is conducted 
constitutes a “trade” as is envisaged by the preamble of section 11, it can still give 
rise to valid claims for deductions.  However, the contra bonos mores concept also 
remains alive and well in South Africa.  Although the Act therefore does not 
expressly or generally rule out the deductibility of losses or expenditure actually 
incurred during the course of unlawful trading activities, the courts may bring this 
well established common law concept or limitation into the equation. 
 
Indubitably however, section 23(o) does introduce or impact upon considerations 
of morality and good (or bad) faith. 
 
However, ex facie the Act itself, the deductions permitted by the current statute are 
not made to depend on the question of legality or illegality, which is also the 
position with respect to the treatment of receipts or accruals. 
 
In the context of avoidance provisions, fault or intention, as well as morality are 
clearly relevant, which is apparent even from a cursory perusal of the wording of    
section 103.  However, the fiscus must bring itself within the ambit of the language 
used in the Income Tax Act, to rely upon the anti-avoidance provisions, such as the 
provisions of section 103 of the Income Tax Act.  Subsection 103(1)(b) is of some 
relevance to this study, and provides: 
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Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied, that any transaction, operation or scheme 
(whether entered into or carried out before or after the commencement of this Act, and 
including transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of the property) -   
a) ……. 
b) having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or 
scheme was entered into or carried out-  
 i) was entered into or carried out- 
(aa) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the context of 
business, in a manner which would not normally be employed for 
bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a tax 
benefit;  and 
(bb) in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme, being a 
transaction, operation or scheme not falling within the provisions 
of item (aa), by means or in a manner which would not normally 
be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, 
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or 
scheme in question;  or 
ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm’s length under a transaction, operation or 
scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question. 
 
The application of the business purpose test to a particular set of facts necessarily 
introduces the concept of fides, which in turn immediately renders considerations 
such as the community convictions and morality, relevant.  The normality or 
abnormality test also invariably renders principles of good faith and the Court’s 
perception of established business norms, relevant.  The arm’s length criterion 
contained in subsection 103(1)(b)(ii), also inevitably calls for a moralistic, 
judgmental assessment.  In this sense, the Income Tax Act itself contains 
provisions which impact directly upon principles of morality and fides. 
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3.3 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
However, it has been shown above that the definitions of direct relevance to the 
income or revenue side, such as the definitions of “gross income”, “income” and 
the undefined concept of a “trade”, do not expressly incorporate or exclude 
accruals or receipts which emanate from either illegal or unlawful activities. 
Whether the modus operandi of a thief constitutes a “trade” giving rise to taxable 
income, is a more complex question.  In principle, the definition of “trade’ 
includes every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or 
venture.  In South Africa, the revenue authorities have in practice certainly not 
turned a blind eye to irregular activities or illegal schemes. Whether or not profit 
was bona fide being pursued, or whether a “trade” was still being conducted even 
though a loss was actually foreseen, are also irrelevant, from a purely 
interpretational perspective.   On the deduction side, the legislature has also elected 
not to expressly refer to morality issues, fault or good faith.  Imprudence, 
negligence or bad faith, are not addressed at all in section 11.  With the exception 
of section 23(d) and the recently introduced section 23(o) which do impact upon 
morality and fides considerations, these considerations are also not directly 
addressed in section 23 of the Act. 
 
In the next chapter, the role which the courts have played in rendering these 
societal values or considerations contextually relevant is accordingly discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  HAVE THE COURTS REGARDED MORES, FIDES 
OR FAULT AS RELEVANT WHEN DEDUCTIONS ARE CLAIMED? 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the Act itself is essentially silent (with 
the exception of certain specific provisions contained in section 23 of the Act), on 
the question whether mores, fault and fides are relevant factors from a deduction 
perspective.  It accordingly becomes necessary to evaluate the role which the 
courts have played in rendering or treating these considerations as relevant.  As 
will be shown below, the negligence and honesty or dishonesty of taxpayers or 
their employees, morality issues and the good faith of taxpayers, have been treated 
as relevant considerations by the courts.  This has occurred both in England and in 
South Africa. 
 
4.1 
 
CASE LAW RELATING TO INCOME 
In the context of avoidance mechanisms, it is clear that English income tax cases 
reflect that morality, particularly the mores of community as interpreted by the 
Law Lords or judges, have played a major role in this regard.  Lord Greene MR, 
stated in the decision of Lord Howard De Walden v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1942] 1 KB 389 18
  
 that: 
For years a battle of manoeuvre has been waged between the legislature and those who 
are minded to throw the burden of taxation off their own shoulders on to those of their 
fellow subjects.  In that battle the legislature has often been worsted by the skill, 
determination and resourcefulness of its opponents, of whom the present appellant has 
not been the least successful.  It would not shock us in the least to find that the legislature 
has determined to put an end to the struggle by imposing the severest of penalties.  It 
                                            
18 At page 397. 
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scarcely lies in the mouth of the taxpayer who plays with fire to complain of burnt 
fingers. 
 
In 1943 Viscount Simon LC, in the case of Latilla v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1943] AC 377,19
 
 said: 
My Lords, of recent years much ingenuity has been expended in certain quarters in 
attempting to devise methods of disposition of income by which those who were prepared 
to adopt them might enjoy the benefits of residence in this country while receiving the 
equivalent of such income without sharing in the appropriate burden of British taxation.  
Judicial dicta may be cited which point out that, however elaborate and artificial such 
methods may be, those who adopt them are “entitled’ to do so.  There is, of course, no 
doubt that they are within their legal rights, but that is no reason why their efforts or those 
of the professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter, should be regarded as a 
commendable exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of the duties of good citizenship.  
On the contrary, one result of such methods, if they succeed, is, of course, to increase pro 
tanto the load of tax on the shoulders of the great body of good citizens who do not 
desire, or do not know how, to adopt these manoeuvres. 
 
In 1949, Lord Normand, in the case of Vestey’s (Lord) Executors & another v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [1949] 1 All ER 110820
 
, made the following 
comment: 
Parliament in its attempts to keep pace with the ingenuity devoted to tax avoidance may 
fall short of its purpose.  That is a misfortune for the taxpayers who do not try to avoid 
their share of the burden, and it is disappointing to the Inland Revenue.  But the court will 
not stretch the terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on the efforts of Parliament and 
to stop gaps which are left open by the statutes.  Tax avoidance is an evil, but it would be 
                                            
19 At page 380 and 381. 
 
20 At page 1120. 
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the beginning of much greater evils if the courts were to overstretch the language of the 
statute in order to subject to taxation people of whom they disapproved. 
However, examples can also be cited of decisions in the United Kingdom in which 
a less moralistic approach was followed.  In Mann v Nash [1932] 1 KB 752;  
[1932] All ER Rep 956 the taxability of profits derived from illegal amusement 
activities was in issue.  In the course of his business as an amusement caterer, the 
Applicant had provided licensed victuallers and others with automatic machines, to 
be used in unlawful gaming.  It was found that although the profits derived from 
the transactions constituted the profits from an illegal trade, they were nonetheless 
taxable.  The profits that were realised from the resale of certain of the machines, 
were also held to be taxable on the somewhat tenuous ground that only the use of 
the machines, and not their possession, was illegal.   
 
Another example of the unmoralistic approach, is the decision in Southern v AB, 
Southern v AB Ltd [1933] 1 KB 713;  [1933] All ER Rep 916.  The Respondents 
in this matter had carried on betting businesses which were unlawful.  The Court 
held that they were engaged in a “trade” within the meaning of the 1918 (English) 
Income Tax Act.  That being the case, the fact that the trade was illegal did not 
prevent the profits arising therefrom from being assessable to income tax. 
 
In the interesting matter of IRC v Aken [1990] 1 WLR 1374; [1990] STC 497, the 
assessment of a prostitute’s earnings for income tax was in issue, albeit in a very 
specific procedural context.  Procedurally, an agreement had been reached 
pursuant to the Taxes Management Act 1970, section 54, regarding the amount 
payable.  The agreed amount was however, not paid by the prostitute and judgment 
was entered against her.  On appeal, the issues were twofold, namely whether the 
taxpayer was entitled, in collection proceedings, to raise the defence that the profits 
of prostitution were not chargeable to tax.  Secondly, if she was entitled to raise 
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such a defence after judgment had been entered, during collection proceedings, 
whether such a defence constituted a sound defence in law?  It was held that the 
agreement which had been reached constituted a binding agreement for good 
consideration which was accordingly enforceable as such.  The contention that the 
inspector had acted ultra vires because he was allegedly not entitled to have raised 
the assessments, was dismissed.  It was found that this argument should have been 
raised on appeal against the assessment and could not be raised after judgment, 
during the collection proceedings. In proceedings such as those that were before 
the Court, it was only very exceptionally open to a taxpayer to bring a challenge 
which would then involve judicial review.  The Court furthermore found that 
prostitution was not itself illegal.  Therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to 
decide whether profits from an illegal trade were taxable.  The appeal of the 
taxpaying prostitute failed in the circumstances21
 
.    
In the erstwhile Rhodesia, MacDonald JP moralistically agreed that the avoidance 
of tax is “an evil” in the decision of COT v Ferera 1976 (2) SA 653 (RAD).   After 
quoting with approval from the above decisions, he states as follows: 
  
I endorse the opinion expressed that the avoidance of tax is an evil.  Not only does it 
mean that a taxpayer escapes the obligation of making his proper contribution to the 
fiscus, but the effect must necessarily be to cast an additional burden on taxpayers who, 
imbued with a greater sense of civic responsibility, make no attempt to escape, or lacking 
the financial means to obtain the advice and set up the necessary tax-avoidance 
machinery, fail to do so.  Moreover, the nefarious practice of tax avoidance arms 
opponents of our capitalistic society with potent arguments that it is only the rich, the 
astute and the ingenious who prosper in it and that ‘good citizens’ will always fare badly.  
                                            
21 If only all South African prostitutes would have been so patriotic as Aken, who seemingly did her bit for  
    Queen and country. 
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While undoubtedly the short term effects of the practice are serious, the long term effects 
could be even more so.22
 
 
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the Act itself contains a wide, non-
moralistic definition of “gross income”.  The Act does not, for example, prohibit 
the taxation of income generated by prostitutes, loan-sharks, pyramid-scheme 
operators, gamblers or professional mercenaries.  The “allowances” received by 
professional soldiers venturing into Sierra Leone or Liberia, are as taxable as the 
income generated by “call-girl” agencies. That statutory provisions or the common 
law may have been contravened in the process of generating income from such 
nefarious practices, is largely immaterial from an accrual/receipt perspective.  The 
fiscus is not a moralist and will insist upon his pound of flesh, so to speak, 
irrespective of whether the particular activity which generated the receipt or 
accrual, might have transcended the law. This is certainly not a modern day 
development. 
 
As long ago as 1921, Rowlatt J stated in the decision of Cape Brandy Syndicate v 
IRC (1921) 1 KB 64 that:   
 
[I]n a taxing act, one has to look merely at what is clearly said: There is not room for any 
intendment.  There is no equity about a tax.  There is no presumption as to a tax.  Nothing 
is to be read in, nothing is to be implied.  One can only look fairly at the language used. 
23
 
 
                                            
22 Page 656 at F. 
 
23 On page 71 of the decision. This dictum was inter alia approved in CIR v Frankel 1949 (3) SA 733 (A)  
   at 738. 
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In CIR v Simpson24, Centlivres JA reflected upon the  aforementioned dictum in 
the Cape Brandy Syndicate case, supra, and stated that the rule should perhaps be 
qualified by saying that even in taxing statutes, something may have to be implied 
by necessity.  In the matter of CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A), 
Corbett JA stated25
 
, after referring to the aforegoing assertion that “there is no 
equity about a tax”, that a measure of satisfaction is still to be gained from a result 
which seems equitable, both from the point of view of the taxpayer and from the 
point of view of the fiscus and that it could be inferred that such a result would be 
in conformity with the intention of the legislature. 
That income derived from an unlawful source does not result in the non-taxability 
of such income, is aptly demonstrated by the decision in Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Company Ltd 1918 TPD 391.  The said 
cigarette company had sold packets of cigarettes which included coupons entitling 
purchasers to take part in certain monthly distributions of prizes or dividends.  
Winning vouchers were advertised and the distributions included prizes ranging 
from £ 2000 to £ 2.  The Commissioner (who was the applicant) was of the opinion 
that the prize dividends were taxable income.  On behalf of the cigarette company, 
it was argued that the amount available for each monthly distribution constituted a 
trust fund which did not form portion of the company’s assets.  It was pertinently 
contended on behalf of the cigarette company that the business of the company was 
illegal and that “the Applicant cannot come to court and ask to participate in an 
illegal business or lottery.  Income tax is only claimable in respect of a legal 
business”.26
                                            
24 CIR v Simpson 1949 (4) SA 678 (A) at 695, and see also Dibowitz v CIR 1952 (1) SA 55 (A) at 61. 
 
 
25 At page 958 of the judgment in Nemojim, supra. 
 
26 See the summary of argument of the legal representative for the cigarette company, on page 393 of the   
    judgment. 
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Bristowe J was not persuaded and found as follows on page 394: 
 
I do not think it is material for the purpose of this case whether the business carried on by 
the company is legal or illegal.  Excess profits duty, like income tax, is leviable on all 
incomes exceeding the specified minimum, and after making the prescribed calculations 
and deducting the exemptions, abatements and deductions enumerated in the statute.  The 
source of income is immaterial.  This was so held in Partridge v. Mallandaine (18 Q.B.D. 
276), where the profits of a betting business was held to be taxable to income tax;  
DENMAN, J., saying that “even the fact of a vocation being unlawful could not be set up 
against the demand for income tax”.  If the income itself is taxable it follows I think that 
if the prizes would have been a legitimate deduction if the business is illegal, they would 
equally be a legitimate deduction if the business is illegal.  The deductions permitted by 
our statute are not made to depend on any question of legality or illegality;  and in 
Partridge v. Mallandaine it was not suggested that betting losses could not be deducted.  
Indeed it seems common sense that if illegal profits are taxable they must be subject to 
the same deductions as if they were legal. 
 
These sentiments are logical and straightforward. However, as will be 
demonstrated further below, it is submitted that an equitable, even-handed 
approach has not consistently been demonstrated with respect to the admissibility 
of deductions, as contrasted with the welcoming manner in which revenue receipts 
originating from moralistically questionable sources have been accommodated 
under the tax net.  
 
An appellant’s winnings which had arisen from betting activities which formed 
part of his racing business, also attracted normal tax, “super” tax and excess profits 
duty in the decision of Morrison v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1950 (2) 
449 (AD).  The Appellate Division approved of the approach which had been 
adopted by the court a quo, which apparently “went straight to the definition of 
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gross income, without considering whether his betting activities constituted a 
‘trade, business … calling, occupation or venture’ within the definition of ‘trade’ in 
sec. 7 of the prevailing Act”.   Schreiner JA, who delivered the judgment on behalf 
of the full bench of the Appellate Division, approved of this straightforward 
approach, as follows: 
 
The learned JUDGE-PRESIDENT concluded that because monies which the appellant 
received from making bets were the proceeds of the employment of wits and his money 
they were not of a capital nature and therefore fell within the definition of “gross 
income”.  It was only when it came to considering the appellant’s liability to pay the 
Excess Profits Duty that the learned JUDGE-PRESIDENT investigated the question 
whether the appellant’s betting activities constituted a “trade”;  and he then held that they 
did. It is difficult to find fault with this line of approach, which, logically, has much in its 
favour.  There is, however, the disadvantage that it might involve, unnecessarily, 
consideration of the question whether money won by isolated bets does not also fall 
within the definition of “gross income”, in which event it would perhaps be difficult to 
escape the conclusion which might be inconvenient, that no account could be taken, in 
the taxpayer’s favour, of his isolated betting losses.  This appeal can, and in my opinion 
should, be decided without examining the question whether in all circumstances monies 
won by betting constitute “gross income”, because if the appellant’s betting activities fell 
within the definition of “trade” it is not in dispute that he was correctly assessed for 
Normal and Super Tax and for Excess Profits Duty.27
 
 
Since these decisions, a number of cases have been decided which relate to income 
derived from illegal activities.  The matters of COT v G 1981 (4) SA 167 (ZA) and 
ITC 291, 7 SATC 335 both related to the misappropriation of funds.  ITC 1545, 54 
SATC 464 dealt with the proceeds of stolen diamonds, whilst ITC 1624, 59 SATC 
373 (which decision is discussed more fully below) dealt with a matter in which 
customers of the taxpayer had been overcharged.  In these cases, the main question 
                                            
27 On page 454. 
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turned on whether or not the amounts were received by the taxpayers for their own 
benefit and therefore had to be included in gross income, or whether the taxpayers 
incurred a concomitant liability to repay the amounts and did not directly involve 
considerations of fides, mores or fault.    
 
The sentiments expressed by the President of the Court, Scott J, in ITC 1545, 54 
SATC 464 are nonetheless relevant to this thesis in a number of respects.  The 
Appellants were the trustees in the insolvent estate of the taxpayer.  During the trial 
of the taxpayer on charges of theft and dealing in uncut diamonds, a revenue 
inspector had sat in Court and had taken notes and later obtained copies of certain 
portions of the typed record of the proceedings.  The admissibility of the record of 
the criminal court proceedings in the Special Income Tax Court, constituted one of 
the major evidential points in issue.  On the basis of the evidence of some of the 
witnesses who had testified at the trial, the Commissioner for Inland Revenue had 
issued additional assessments for three tax years, in which he had included an 
amount representing the profits which were realised from the buying and selling of 
stolen diamonds.  In respect of two different financial years, the Commissioner had 
included in the taxpayer’s taxable income an amount of R 1 000 000.00, being the 
profit which the taxpayer had made from the sale of dried milk cultures to a 
company which he controlled.  As far as the taxpayer’s profit derived from the 
purchase and sale of stolen diamonds was concerned, it was common cause at the 
hearing that the taxpayer was aware of the fact that the diamonds which he had 
purchased and sold at a profit, had been stolen and that his conduct amounted to 
theft.  It was also common cause that the proceeds of the sales amounted to a 
“receipt or accrual” within the meaning of the definition of “gross income” in 
section 1 of Act 58 of 1962.  This was accordingly not a case in which there had 
been no receipt, but merely a “taking” by a thief.  Somewhat ingeniously, it was 
submitted on behalf of the taxpayer that by reason of his conduct which had 
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amounted to theft, he had rendered himself liable to the owner of the diamonds for 
the return of the diamonds or their value.  This liability, so it was argued, 
constituted an inseparable and necessary concomitant of the “trade” of dealing in 
stolen diamonds.  It was further contended that as this liability had arisen 
immediately at the time of each transaction, it constituted deductible expenditure in 
terms of section 11(a) of the Act, for each of the years in which a profit was made. 
(In this regard, it is relevant to point out that the owner of the diamonds did indeed 
institute proceedings against the taxpayer arising out of the transactions in 
question.)  
 
It was contended on behalf of the taxpayer that the Commissioner could only 
assess the Appellant once the quantum of the owner’s claim had been determined.  
The Commissioner disagreed and contended that whatever the taxpayer’s liability 
to the owner of the diamonds might turn out to be, such liability would not 
constitute deductible expenditure incurred in the relevant years of assessment.  The 
point was made that in order to be deductible, the liability had to be one which is 
definite and absolute and not one which is merely contingent.  This contention 
succeeded.  In the circumstances, the potential liability did not constitute 
“expenditure….actually incurred” within the meaning of section 11(a) of the Act.  
The implicit acceptance by the representatives of both parties and by the Court that 
the illegal nature of the income and the immoral manner in which such income was 
realised, did not detract from the taxability of the profits and could in principle also 
give rise to valid deductions, is the real point of significance for this thesis. 
 
With respect to the profits which were generated from the dried milk culture 
scheme, it was contended that this scheme constituted a “lottery” in terms of 
section 2(1) of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965.  It was accordingly contended that 
the sales in pursuance of which the “growers” were paid for their crop, were void 
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ab initio.  It was held by the Court that the amounts which were paid to the 
growers for their “milk culture”, nevertheless constituted amounts “received” by 
them in terms of the definition of “gross income” as defined in section 1 of the Act.  
 
After emphasising the distinction between “receipts” and “accruals”, and referring 
to the requirement that a “receipt” by a taxpayer implies a receipt on his own 
behalf and for his own benefit, Scott J proceeded as follows28
 
:  
Indeed, it could never have been intended that an amount received on behalf of another 
should fall within the gross income of the recipient.  Where, however, an amount is 
received by a taxpayer on his own behalf and for his own benefit but in pursuance of a 
void transaction there seems to me to be no reason for holding that such amount is not 
‘received’ within the meaning of the section, if that word is to be given its ordinary literal 
meaning.  Not to do so could lead to anomalies.  It would mean, for example, that if a 
trader were to sell his goods on a Sunday in breach of a local by-law, the price paid to 
him would not be ‘received’ by him and would not form part of his gross income.  I can 
find nothing in the Act to justify such a construction; nor was any basis suggested by 
counsel for limiting the meaning of the word ‘received’ in this way.  The mere fact that 
the receipt was the consequence of a void transaction is no reason for ignoring it.  Indeed, 
it does not follow that because a contract is prohibited by statute and therefore void inter 
partes, it is to be totally disregarded and all the consequences flowing from it ignored.   
 
It was accordingly held that the amounts which had been paid by the company to 
the “growers” for their “milk culture”, constituted amounts “received” by them as 
envisaged by the definition of “gross income” in section 1 of the Act. 
 
In COT v G, supra, the obiter distinction between “taking” (or appropriating) 
something and “receiving” something, which was drawn by Lord Denning in 
                                            
28 On page 474. 
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Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v JP Harrison (Watford) ltd 1963 AC 1, was 
referred to with apparent approval.  The validity of such a distinction is 
questionable. 
 
A thief who steals money appropriates such moneys for himself.  He acts not only 
deliberately, with dolus, but also has the animus dominandi (that is, to act as owner 
of the stolen moneys).  The finding of Fieldsend CJ in COT v G, (supra) (with 
whose judgment Baron JA and Goldin AJA concurred), that the word “received” 
cannot be extended to cover a unilateral act such as theft, is in my view 
unsatisfactory.  No explanation or reasoning is furnished, from an interpretational 
perspective.  The implicit imputation to the Legislature of such a restrictive 
legislative intent, is not properly motivated.  Even more unsatisfactory is the view 
expressed by Fieldsend CJ29
(W)hether or not the respondent in this appeal received the money on his own behalf and 
for his own benefit must depend 
, that: 
not only on his own intention but on the intention of the 
person who passed the money to him
 (own emphasis) 
.  
No one “passes” money to a thief.   More importantly, the suggestion that the 
giver must intend the result (of appropriation as well) seems contrived.  Even the 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary30
                                            
29 At page 171 B to C. 
 meaning of the concept “to receive” quoted in the 
Court’s decision, calls for a mere objective, face value test.  Obviously, whether 
the receipt is of an income or capital nature, might necessitate a more “subjective” 
evaluation of the receipt and of the intention of the recipient taxpayer.  (CIR v 
Leydenberg Platinum 1929 AD 137).   
 
30 At page 169 F of the COT v G judgment. 
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The purported reliance by the Zimbabwean Court of Appeal in COT v G, supra, on 
the decision in Geldenhuys v CIR 1947 (3) SA 256 (C), was also misplaced, as the 
position between a usufructuary who knows that she is a mere holder of a 
servitudal right, and not the owner, and has no intention to steal or appropriate the 
proceeds of a sale – which the Court found were not sold by her qua usufructuary – 
cannot be equated with a thief who steals the funds for himself. 
 
The words “received by or accrued to” do require, according to various decisions, 
a receipt by, or an accrual to, the taxpayer on his own behalf or for his own benefit.  
Vide:  Secretary for Inland Revenue v Smant 1973 (1) SA 754 (A) at 764 B – C.   
However, it is submitted that this requirement was satisfied by the thieving 
taxpayer in COT v G, supra.  If the emphasis is placed on the question whether the 
receipt or proceeds of the illegal activity has the quality of “income” in the hands 
of the scheming taxpayer or thief, instead of concentrating on public policy 
principles or societal values, the difficulty to tax such receipts or proceeds might 
well fall away.   
 
It appears from the aforegoing cases that the particular facts may be decisive in 
determining whether the illegal activities concerned should be regarded as 
constituting a “trade” or not, so that each case should therefore be separately 
adjudged.   
 
In ITC 1624, 59 SATC 373, the Appellant was a close corporation which carried 
on business as custom clearing and freight forwarding agents.  The Appellant 
rendered services to a customer, which included the making of payments to the 
harbour authority of certain wharfage fees on behalf of the client, which it was 
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entitled to recover from the client.  Through the efforts of a former member, but 
without knowledge of the managing member, accounts were rendered by the close 
corporation to the client reflecting wharfage fees disbursed by it in excess of the 
actual expenditure incurred.   An excessive amount was accordingly recovered 
from the customer.  One disgruntled, but apparently honest employee reported this 
irregularity to the client and to the Receiver of Revenue.  A contention on behalf of 
the Appellant that the moneys had constituted loans in the nature of capital receipts 
which had not been received by the Appellant “on its own behalf and for its own 
benefit”, was rejected by Wunsh J.  It was held that where a trader received a 
payment of money in the course of carrying on its trade, which it obtains by 
making fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations to a customer, it nonetheless 
receives such moneys as part of its business income and in the course of its 
business.   
 
An example was given by the court of a dishonest attorney who recovers from his 
client a sum for a witness fee, but corruptly negotiates with the witness to accept a 
lesser sum than he or she had charged, so that he or she could retain the balance.  
Wunsh J asserted that in such circumstances, it cannot be suggested that the 
attorney had not received in the tax sense, the overcharged amount.  He found that 
the same reasoning applied to the disputed sum which had been obtained by the 
Appellant who had overcharged his client in the case before him.  The dishonesty 
or immorality, which were involved in the process, did not change the fact that the 
receipt was taxable. 
 
4.2 
 
CASE LAW RELATING TO DEDUCTIONS FROM INCOME 
The court, in ITC 1624, 59 SATC 373, then had reason to consider whether the 
same amount could be deducted as expenditure actually incurred in the production 
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of the income.  It was contended on behalf of the Appellant that the amount was so 
deductible as the Appellant had allegedly become subject to a simultaneous and 
corresponding liability to repay the amount.  However, the court held that the mere 
fact that the Appellant had an obligation to restore what it had unlawfully taken did 
not satisfy the legal requirements to constitute a permissible deduction.  Obiter, it 
was stated that “it may well be that if it paid the amount it would incur a loss which 
would be treated as having been incurred in the production of its income as a 
necessary concomitant of the trade dishonestly carried on by it.  But that has not 
happened”.31
 
  The fact that the amount was never repaid, weighed heavily with the 
court in finding that the disputed sum did not constitute expenditure or a loss 
actually incurred in the production of income in the particular year of assessment.     
Of specific relevance to this dissertation, is the vexed question which was touched 
upon by Wunsh J in ITC 1624, SATC 373, namely whether morality, fault or fides 
have a role to play with regard to the general deduction formula, and if so, which 
role?  In this regard, it also is necessary to refer to the role which has been played 
by our Courts in the interpretation of statutory provisions, in particular, factual 
scenarios over the years.   
 
That morality and fault, particularly dolus (in the sense of fraud having been 
committed), was regarded as relevant by Lord Brightman J in the matter of 
Bamford (Inspector of Taxes) v A T A Advertising Ltd [1972] 3 All ER 535 ChD, 
is apparent from the reasoning of the learned Judge.  Brightman J described the 
principal question in this appeal as being “whether a company could deduct for tax 
purposes, a sum of which it was robbed by one of its directors”.  The other 
directors were unaware of the misappropriation of the funds by the errant director, 
a Major Newnham.  Whether that loss was deductible as having arisen out of, or in 
                                            
31 At page 381 of the judgment. 
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connection with the company’s trade (advertising and publicity work), was in 
issue.  Section 137 of the (English) Income Tax Act 1952, inter alia provided that 
no amount could be deducted if such amount was not wholly and exclusively laid 
out or expended for the purposes of the trade, profession or vocation and 
furthermore if such loss was not connected with or arising out of the trade, 
profession or vocation.  Relying on an earlier decision, the counsel for the 
taxpaying company contended that there was no logical distinction to be drawn 
between petty theft by a subordinate and massive defalcation by a director (in an 
earlier decision, petty theft by an employee had been allowed as a deduction). To 
this contention, Brigthman J responded, in my view somewhat unconvincingly, as 
follows:32
 
 
In my view, there is a distinction.  I can quite see that the commissioners might find as a 
fact that a £5 note taken from the till by a shop assistant is a loss to the trader which is 
connected with and arises out of the trade.  A large shop has to use tills and to employ 
assistants with access to those tills.  It could not trade in any other way.  That, it seems to 
me, is quite a different case from a director with authority to sign cheques who helps 
himself to £15,000, which is then lost to the company.   I find it difficult to see how such 
a loss could be regarded fairly as ‘connected with or arising out of the trade’.  In the 
defaulting director type of case, there seems to me to be no relevant nexus between the 
loss of the money and the conduct of the company’s trade.  The loss is not, as in the case 
of the dishonest shop assistant, an incident of the company’s trading activities.  It arises 
altogether outside such activities.  That, I think, is the true distinction.  In my view, the 
decision in the Roebank case did not depend on the absence of fraud.  I consider that it is 
a decision which I should follow.  I therefore reject counsel for the taxpayer company’s 
submission that the loss of the £15,000 is within the subject-matter of para (e) of s 137. 
 
Whilst Brigthman J attempted to motivate his distinction on a factual basis (“it 
arises altogether outside such activities”), it appears that morality as well as the 
                                            
32 At page 544 of the judgment. 
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deliberate, fraudulent conduct (namely, the direct intention or dolus of Major 
Newnham) did influence his reasoning.  It is unconvincing to premise the 
distinction between theft committed by a shop assistant and theft committed by a 
director upon the amount involved.  Whether £5 is stolen, or £15,000 is stolen, is 
neither here nor there.  The principle remains the same.  Moreover, the mere fact 
that the shop assistant and the director may occupy positions at markedly different 
levels of employment is also, in the writer’s view, not a valid distinction.  Perhaps, 
the distinction might lie in the premeditated, calculated nature of the conduct? 
However, such a purported distinction will also be invalid:  on the postulated facts, 
both the shop assistant who steals £5 as well as the director who steals £15,000, 
will be acting with the same thievious intent or dolus.  Both would have the same 
intention, namely to deliberately misappropriate funds.  Another possible reason 
for the distinction could perhaps have been found in the judge’s assessment of the 
convictions of the community, if such communi mores are hypothetically applied 
to the facts.  Alternatively, the judge could also have relied on public policy 
principles, in disallowing the deduction, should the deduction not otherwise have 
been found to fall outside the ambit of the provisions of the relevant Act.  In 
conclusion, the reasoning of the learned judge of the Chancery Division in the said 
English decision, as well as the conclusion reached, namely that the conduct of the 
director amounted to a frolic of his own, but not the conduct of a stealing shop 
assistant, are unconvincing.  
 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, one Macnaghten J found it 
necessary to deal with an altogether different war, namely a war of words, in the 
unexpected domain of tax law.  In the matter of J.L. Fairrie v J.M. Hall 
(Inspector of Taxes) [1947] 2 141 KBD the taxpayer, a sugar broker, had 
published a malicious libel against the chairman of a rival company.  The taxpayer 
was the selling agent for a company which produced sugar in Cuba.  He accused a 
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Mr Rook, the chairman of Czarnikow, Ltd, a company of “very high standing in 
the city of London” who acted as selling agents for various sugar producers 
throughout the world, of having abused his official position as a Deputy Director 
of Sugar Supplies at the Ministry of Food in order to advance the interests of his 
own company.  The decidedly aggrieved Mr Rook instituted a libel action for 
damages against the taxpayer.  The defence which was raised that the occasion of 
the communication of the libel was privileged because it was made in the defence 
of the interests of the Cuban company for whom the taxpayer represented, did not 
impress the jury.  It accordingly failed.  Mr Rook was awarded £550 damages and 
the taxpayer was also directed to pay the costs of the action.  The taxpayer 
contended that these sums ought to have been deducted from the assessment made 
of him in respect of his profits as a sugar broker.  It was held that the damages and 
costs, although in one sense connected with the taxpayer’s trade in that his object 
in publishing the libel was to increase his own profits, were not a loss “connected 
with or arising out of” his trade within the meaning of the (English) Income Tax 
Act, 1918.  It was also held that these expenses did not constitute disbursements or 
expenses which were laid out exclusively for the purposes of the trade and that 
they could accordingly not be deducted from the assessment.  The matter was 
decided on the basis that the loss was “too remotely connected” with the taxpayer’s 
trade as a sugar broker.  That the taxpayer’s conduct might have been actuated by 
malice or bad faith was not pertinently discussed.  The causality issue was only 
peripherally addressed.  It is enlightening, however, that the judge relied 
substantially upon the decision of the House of Lords in Strong & Company Ltd v 
Woodifield [1906] A.C. 448.  In that judgment, an apparently moralistic distinction 
was drawn between losses sustained by railway companies which had compensated 
passengers who were injured whilst they were transported (which expenditure 
could be deducted) and a loss arising from a grocer’s shop window which had 
fallen on a passer-by, resulting in a damages claim, which, according to Lord 
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Loreburn, L.C, could not be deducted.  The explanation that the nature of the trade 
was decisive was unconvincing on the facts.  It rather appears that an imprecise 
morality assessment, or a policy driven motivation, underlay the ratio.   
 
Public policy grounds clearly influenced the following comment of Lord Denning 
in the well-known matter of Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v JP Harrison 
(Watford) Ltd 1963 AC 1:33
 
 
[T]ake a gang of burglars.  Are they engaged in trade or an adventure in the nature of 
trade?  They have an organisation.  They spend money on equipment.  They acquire 
goods by their efforts.  They sell the goods.  They make a profit.  What detail is lacking 
in their adventure?  You may say it lacks legality, but it has been held that legality is not 
an essential characteristic of a trade.  You cannot point to any detail that it lacks.  But still 
it is not a trade, nor an adventure in the nature of trade.  And how does it help to ask the 
question:  If it is not a trade, what is it? It is burglary and that is all there is to say about it. 
 
Williams and Louw, the authors of the work Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax 
in South Africa: Law and Practice34
 
, pose the following question in the 
aforementioned regard: 
On the other hand, is it not equally distasteful from a public policy view point to accord 
criminals’ exemption from tax?35
 
,  
and proceed to assert on the same page that: 
 
                                            
33 At page 20. 
 
34  Williams, R.C, assisted by Louw, C (3rd Edition). Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax in South     
    Africa: Law and Practice.  Durban:  LexisNexis Butterworths, page 137. 
 
35  ibid 
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[I]n practice SARS regards the proceeds derived from illegal activities such as the 
keeping of a brothel, illicit diamond dealing and drug dealing as subject to income tax. 
 
Closer to home, the writer has already referred to the decisions in Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway Company Ltd, the Joffe decision and to the decision in Sub-
Nigel.  The authors of Broomberg Tax Strategy, Kruger and Scholtz36
 
 state that 
the following two propositions “at least emerge” from these decisions: 
a) the taxpayer, in order to succeed in his claim for a deduction of the amount paid 
as damages, must be able to show that the risk of his having to make payment of 
compensation is a necessary concomitant of his trading operations; 
 
b) that the act to which the payment of compensation is attached was undertaken by 
the taxpayer for the purpose of producing income; and that the payment of 
compensation is closely linked to that act. 
 
The aforementioned authors submit that the tests are too mechanical and contrived 
to be applied in the hard reality of commerce and industry.  They assert that the test 
laid down by Mason J in Lockie Bros Ltd v CIR 1922 TPD 42 was to be preferred.  
In the said decision, it was held that an expense would be allowed as a deduction if 
the expense was incurred in the course of, or by reason of the ordinary operations 
conducted by the taxpayer in the carrying on of his trade.  The two aforementioned 
authors contend, with justification, that had this test been applied in the Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Ltd and Joffe decisions, supra, both 
taxpayers would have qualified for the deduction.  In their view, that would have 
been the correct answer.   
 
                                            
36 Kruger, D, and Scholtz, W. (Fourth Edition) Broomberg on Tax Strategy. Durban:  LexisNexis   
    Butterworths, page 223. 
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Much of the difficulty which one has with the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Company Ltd case arises from certain obiter or unnecessary comments made by            
Watermeyer AJP during the course of his judgment.  The judge refers to two 
English decisions, namely CIR v Thompson 1935 TPD 166 and Usher’s Wiltshire 
Brewery v Bruce 1915 AC 433, and concludes that the House of Lords had 
allowed various expenses because the expenses had all to some extent been 
attendant upon the ownership of certain tied houses and the acquisition of 
ownership was an act done for the purpose of more efficiently selling the beer 
brewed by the company.  He continues as follows: 
 
It follows that provided the act is bona fide done for the purpose of carrying on the trade 
which earns the income the expenditure attendant on it is deductible”37
 
 
It appears that the judge however did regard fault or morality as relevant 
considerations, in his further obiter comment:38
 
  
It seems, however, that this statement may require qualification in one respect.  If the act 
done is unlawful or negligent and the attendant expense is occasioned by the 
unlawfulness or possibly the negligence of the act, then probably it would not be 
deductible.      
There are two English cases which point that way.  In the case of Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue v von Glehn and Company Ltd 1920 (2) KB 553 a trader in the course of 
his business traded with the enemy and became liable to a fine, it was held that he could 
not deduct such fine.  In the case of Strong and Company of Romsey v Woodifield 1906 
AC 448 an innkeeper incurred liability towards a guest in his inn owing to the collapse of 
a chimney and it was held that this expense could not be deducted.  In this case the 
Judges differed in their reasons and the judgments are not very helpful, but the Lord 
                                            
37 At page 245. 
 
38 ibid 
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Chancellor suggested that possibly a railway company which had to compensate injured 
passengers could deduct such compensation – presumably on the ground that payment of 
compensation in such cases was an expense attendant upon the operations of railway 
transport, and because no amount of care could prevent it arising from time to time, it 
was so closely connected with such operations as to form part of the cost of performing 
them.  There is in fact a decision of the Special Court to that effect in the case of a 
tramway company reported at 1 SATC 57.  I shall not, however, deal further with the 
question of unlawfulness of a business operation or negligence in carrying out because 
they do not arise in this case. 
 
These references to the possible relevance of lawfulness and fault (negligence) 
detract from the bona fide test postulated.  A person who is negligent, is not 
necessarily a person who is not acting in good faith.  Moreover, the fact that a 
particular action might constitute a contravention of a statutory prohibition and 
might be unlawful, does not necessarily mean that such conduct or act committed 
was not performed bona fide.  Illegality of conduct, or so called “unlawfulness”  
used in a technical sense, may obviously constitute an objective limitation.  
However, expenditure actually incurred in circumstances when statutory 
prohibitions were contravened, should not automatically or necessarily result in the 
disqualification of such expenditure as a deduction.  The relevant enactments 
which contain the prohibitions, may themselves provide for the imposition of fines 
or other penalties, which, from an interpretational perspective, may suffice as a 
sanction suggested by the Legislature.39
 
   
In ITC 1490 (1990), 53 SATC 108 (T) Melamet J emphasised that his decision to 
disallow the deduction of traffic fines from the income of a company which carried 
on business as a carriage company, was premised on public policy.  The Appellant 
                                            
39 Compare:  Pottie v Kotzé 1954 (3) SA 719 A.D. and see generally:  Steyn, L.C. (Fifth Edition) Die  
                     Uitleg van Wette.  Cape Town:  Juta & Company Ltd, Chapter VI, pp 192 to 202. 
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owned fifteen trucks and had a turnover of R 7 000 000.00.  In respect of certain 
financial years it claimed as deductible expenditure, moneys which had been paid 
in respect of traffic fines, which were however disallowed by the Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue.  The Appellant contended that such expenditure was properly 
deductible in terms of section 11(a) of the Act, in that it was incurred in the 
production of income and as an inevitable concomitant of the Appellant’s trade.  
Melamet J referred to the Road Transportation Act as well as the Road Traffic Act, 
which contain specific provisions relating to the commission of offences in 
connection with the driving of the trucks.  A circular was sent by the Appellant to 
its customers in which they were advised that fines for overloading and additional 
costs incurred to rectify overloaded vehicles would be charged to the client, 
consignor or principal concerned. Overloading often occurred because of the 
requirements of the authorities that the mass of the loads be equally distributed 
over the truck.  However, certain customers could not avoid overloading the trucks.  
The drivers would then telephone the office of the Appellant to inform the 
Appellant that the particular truck was overloaded, but in many instances the 
customer was in the country districts and it would have been uneconomical to send 
out another smaller truck to transport the excess load.  The Appellant accordingly 
undertook a deliberate risk to retain the business. In so doing, the risk of the 
detection of an offence was accepted as a concomitant of keeping the business of 
the customer.  If the drivers were then charged with overloading, the fines would 
be paid by the Appellant, who then recovered the fines from the customer by way 
of an additional fee raised for conveying the load.  If the Appellant was charged, 
the matter was defended unless the charge was changed to one permitting a fine 
only, without the risk of confiscation of the truck.  The fine was then paid.   
 
The managing director of the Appellant, who gave evidence, was of the view that 
the risk of a fine was always present for a transport operator.  He testified that it 
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was not possible to conduct a transport business without committing these 
offences.  Importantly, he later changed his position to assert that it was possible to 
conduct a business without committing these offences, but not practical to do so.  
He conceded that he could have used a second smaller truck or obtained a 
temporary permit for an abnormal load.  Nonetheless the Appellant contended that 
in the circumstances of the case, the fines which had been paid by the Appellant in 
connection with the overloading of its vehicles on the instructions or at the request 
of its customers, did qualify for a deduction.  
 
Melamet J referred to the reasoning which had been adopted by Margo J in ITC 
1199, 36 SATC 16, in which Margo J had preferred the following interpretation 
which was given by the Australian High Court in Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation 2 ATD 16940
 
 to the judgments in the English 
cases of CIR v Warnes 12 TC 227 (KB) and CIR v Alexander von Glehn & Co 
Ltd 12 TC 232 (CA) namely: 
The penalty is imposed as a punishment of the offender considered as a responsible 
person owing obedience to the law.  Its nature severs it from the expenses of trading. It is 
inflicted on the offender as a personal deterrent, and it is not incurred by him in his 
character of trader. 
 
Melamet J also cited with approval from another Australian decision, Mayne 
Nickless Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 15 ATR 752, which was heard 
in the Supreme Court of Victoria during 1984.  In that matter, the Victoria 
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against the disallowance of deductions for 
fines which had been imposed, on grounds of public policy.  Melamet J quoted the 
                                            
40 At page 172. 
 
58 
 
 
following passage of the aforementioned Australian judgment delivered by 
Ormiston J41
 
:  
From this I can only conclude that the “public policy” inherent in these cases and dicta 
either may have been thought to be a fundamental distinction by which fines and 
penalties were separated from other deductible outgoings or it may have been predicated 
upon some unstated concept of preventing the frustration of the law by diluting those 
fines and penalties.  For present purposes I care not which approach be taken.  They each 
lead to the same conclusion.  For reasons I have already expressed the cases and dicta are 
of sufficient authority for me to consider that I should follow them.  The critical feature 
of fines and penalties are that they are imposed for purposes of the law in order to punish 
breachers thereof and that makes it undesirable that they should be deductible, whether 
for serious or minor offences and whether they are imposed directly on the taxpayer or on 
its employees or third party contractors. In the latter case the policy of law ought not to 
differ whether or not the money was originally paid by, or the original liability fell on, 
persons other than the taxpayer. 
   Although I think either basis of this public policy leads to the same conclusion, I prefer 
to reach it by holding that the policy of the law denies the right to claim these deductions 
on the ground that it would frustrate the legislative intent in that the punishment imposed 
would be, or would be seen to be, diminished or lightened.42
 
 
The Mayne Nickless judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria was approved and 
applied by the full court of the Federal Court of Australia in Madad Pty Limited v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation 15 ATR 1118.  The relevant dicta of the 
Federal Court were quoted as follows: 
 
The approach may well have its origins in public policy.  In any event, it has been of long 
standing, and having in mind the application it must have had over many years, we 
                                            
41 At page 773 of the Mayne Nickless Ltd decision, supra. 
 
42 This passage as quoted appears on page 114 of ITC 1490. 
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should not disturb it, for reasons similar to those stated by Dixon CJ in Lunney’s case, 
supra.   
  A consideration which may be regarded as tending against this result is the deductibility 
of expenses incurred in conducting illegal activities.  Starting price betting, or brothel-
keeping, may be examples.  The fact is, however, that the income from such sources is 
regarded as taxable (see Minister of Finance v Smith (1927) ACT 193), and deductibility 
of expenses flows almost necessarily.  Fines imposed for conducting these activities 
would not, however, be deductible.43
 
 
After quoting with approval from these Australian decisions, Melamet J held as 
follows in ITC 1490: 
 
I am in agreement with the conclusion and reasoning of Margo J in ITC 1199, supra, but 
I would prefer to base my conclusion on the basis that to allow fines imposed for an 
infraction of the law to be deducted as an expense in terms of s 11(a) and 23(g) of the  
Income Tax Act, would be contrary to public policy in that it would frustrate the 
legislative intent and allow a punishment imposed to be diminished or lightened. 
  On the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that the fines do not play any actual 
part in the earning of the income as the income had already been earned by charging a 
higher fee for the increase in the load to provide for the risk of a possible fine.  It was 
conceded by the witness that it would be possible, although in his view impractical to 
conduct a transport business without contravening the provisions of the statutes as to 
overloading.  It would, therefore, appear that incurring such fines is not an inevitable 
concomitant of the business of a cartage contractor. 
  We are of the opinion, therefore, that the appellant has not established that the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue was wrong in disallowing the deductions claimed in 
respect of the fines imposed. 
 
                                            
43 ibid. 
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In the said decision the Court accordingly made it very clear that public policy 
principles, or the boni mores of the community, had a role to play when the 
deductibility of expenditure of this nature was considered.  
 
It could possibly be contended that on the facts of the case, the deliberate 
acceptance of the risk of overloading and of contravening road transportation 
legislation was indicative of an absence of good faith on the part of the taxpayer.  
The Court did not consider the issue of fault as a relevant consideration, which is 
to be welcomed.  However, if fault was a relevant consideration (and it is not 
submitted that it should have been) then clearly the taxpayer could not allege that 
his conduct displayed mere negligence.  On the contrary, the taxpayer’s conduct 
manifested dolus44
 
.  The rationale that the allowance of such a deduction could 
undermine the road transportation system as well as public safety, does have merit.  
However, it is a non sequitur that all statutory offences (particularly those of which 
the elements are satisfied upon proof of negligence and not proof of dolus), should 
automatically result in the disqualification of expenditure incurred in respect of 
fines or penalties.   
The view that public policy could be invoked, even in the absence of statutory 
language permitting such an intervention by the Court, was the position adopted by 
the United States Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). As was also the situation in ITC 1490, 
supra, a carriage company again played the main role.  At issue was whether fines 
imposed for the operation of trucks in violation of state maximum weight laws 
                                            
44 The consequence of committing the offences was foreseen, with which the taxpayer had reconciled  
    himself.  The taxpayer accordingly knew that such a particular consequence was wrongful and illegal. 
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were “ordinary and necessary” business expenses under article 23(a)(1)(A) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.  The Court held:45
 
 
A finding of “necessity” cannot be made… If allowance of the deduction would frustrate 
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, 
evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof…. 
 
  …It is clear that assessment of the fines was punitive action and not a mere toll for use 
of the highways:  the fines occurred only in the exceptional instance when the overweight 
run was detected by the police.  Petitioner’s failure to comply with the state laws 
obviously was based on a balancing of the cost of compliance against the chance of 
detection.  Such a course cannot be sanctioned, for judicial deference to state action 
requires, whenever possible, that a State not be thwarted in its policy.  We will not 
presume that the Congress, in allowing deductions for income tax purposes, intended to 
encourage a business enterprise to violate the declared policy of a State.  To allow the 
deduction sought here would but encourage continued violations of state law by 
increasing the odds in favor of noncompliance.  This could only tend to destroy the 
effectiveness of the State’s maximum weight laws. 
 
It should be pointed out that in 1969 the American Congress amended article 162 
of the Internal Revenue Code to disallow, inter alia, the deduction of an “any fine 
or similar penalty paid to government for the violation of any law”.   
 
In the leading Canadian decision on this issue, 65302 British Columbia Limited v 
Canada [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, the Supreme Court of Canada held that businesses 
operating in Canada were able to deduct fines or penalties levied for violating laws 
from their business income for tax purposes.   The Court’s decision was based on 
the fact that the Canadian Income Tax Act did not explicitly state that such fines 
could not be deducted from business income.  The Appellant had carried on a 
                                            
45 At pages 33 to 35. 
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poultry farm business in British Columbia.  The Appellant was a registered egg 
producer and due to local market conditions, it decided to produce over-quota from 
1984 to 1988.  The over-quota layers were discovered and an over-quota levy 
raised, which the Appellant paid.  When filing its returns under the Canadian 
Income Tax Act, the Appellant included the profit from its over-quota production 
in its income.  In 1988 the Appellant deducted the over-quota levy as a business 
expense pursuant to sections 9(1) and 18(1)(a) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, 
which resulted in a non-capital loss which was carried back to its 1985 taxation 
year.  In its 1989 taxation year, the Appellant deducted the interest paid on the 
unpaid balance of the levy and legal expenses incurred for representation, in 
respect of the over-quota levy.  Upon reassessment of its 1985, 1988 and 1989 tax 
returns, the Minister of National Revenue disallowed the deductions of the over-
quota levy, loss carry back, interest and legal expenses.  In the Tax Court of 
Canada, the parties agreed that the deductibility of the loss carry back, interest and 
legal expenses depended upon the deductibility over the over-quota levy.  The Tax 
Court held that the over-quota levy was deductible as a business expense and that 
this deduction was not prohibited by section 18(1)(b) of the Act.  The Federal 
Court of Appeal set aside the Tax Court’s decision.  The central question in the 
appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada was accordingly whether the over-
quota levy could be deducted as a business expense from the taxpayer’s business 
income.   
 
The appeal was successful.  It was found that the over-quota levy constituted an 
allowable deduction pursuant to sections 9(1) and 18(1)(a) of the Canadian Income 
Tax Act.  The levy was incurred as part of the Appellant’s day-to-day operations 
and the decision to produce over-quota was a business decision made in order to 
realise income.  The Court found that the characterisation of the levy as a “fine” or 
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as a “penalty” was of no consequence, because the Canadian income tax system 
does not distinguish between levies, fines and penalties.   
 
Particularly thought-provoking and apposite to this thesis are the comments of 
Iacobucci J who emphasised the need for a neutral or even-handed approach on the 
income (taxability) side and on the deduction side.  His point of departure was 
from the premise that public policy principles should not lightly be raised by 
Courts of law and is essentially a matter which should be pronounced upon by the 
legislature.  According to Iacobucci J, who was supported by his brethren, “public 
policy determinations are better left to Parliament”46.  The said judge also stated47
 
 
that: 
…in calculating income, it is well established that the deduction of expenses incurred to 
earn income generated from illegal acts is allowed.  For example, not only is the income 
of a person living from the avails of prostitution liable to tax, but the expenses incurred to 
earn this income are also deductible:  M.N.R. v. Eldridge, [1964] C.T.C 545 (Ex. Ct.).  
See also Espie Printing Co. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1960] Ex. C.R. 422.  
Allowing a taxpayer to deduct expenses for a crime would appear to frustrate the 
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46; however, tax authorities are not concerned with 
the legal nature of an activity.  Thus, in my opinion, the same principles should apply to 
the deduction of fines incurred for the purpose of gaining income because prohibiting the 
deductibility of fines and penalties is inconsistent with the practice of allowing the 
deduction of expenses incurred to earn illegal income. 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court was furthermore not persuaded by an argument that 
to allow the deduction of penalties or fines would dilute the deterrent effect of the 
fine or penalty.  If there was merit in that submission, it was the view of      
                                            
46 See paragraph 62 of the judgment. 
 
47 In paragraph 56 of the judgment. 
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Iacobucci J that the Court will then have to determine whether a particular fine or 
penalty was in fact meant to be deterrent in nature, or not.  Of particular relevance 
are the following comments:48
 
  
59  These difficulties outlined above demonstrate that the public policy 
arguments ask courts to make difficult determinations with questionable authority.  
Moreover, they place a high burden on the taxpayer who is to engage in this analysis in 
filling out his or her income tax return and would appear to undermine the objective of 
self-assessment underlying our tax system:  see Hogg and Magee, supra, at p. 243.  In 
addition, it is my opinion that the fundamental principles and provisions of the Act in the 
final analysis dictate that the rule be deductibility.   
 
60  Tax neutrality and equity are key objectives of our tax system.  Tax 
neutrality is violated by tax concessions, since the purpose of such concessions is to 
influence people’s behaviour through the tax system by providing incentives for engaging 
in certain types of behaviour.  For example, a deduction for an RRSP or a charitable 
contribution is a tax concession.  This is to be distinguished from deductions allowed for 
the purpose of gaining an accurate picture of a taxpayer’s net income.  One of the 
underlying premises of our tax system is that the state taxes only net, rather than gross, 
income because it is net income that measures a taxpayer’s ability to pay. As has been 
pointed out, this results in business-related fines being deductible:  see Hogg and Magee, 
supra, at p. 243.  Moreover, Hogg and Magee, at p. 40, “in a system that is generally 
related to ability to pay, the provisions that violate neutrality (tax concessions) tend also 
to violate equity by abandoning the criterion of ability to pay in favour of other policy 
objectives”. 
 
61  Business expenses allowed under s. 18(1)(a) are deductible because of the 
concern to tax only net income, not in order to provide tax concessions to businesses.  
Such deductions are therefore consistent with the principles of tax neutrality and equity.  
                                            
48 Paragraphs 59 to 62 of Iacobucci J’s judgment. 
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The argument to disallow fines and penalties is thus an argument that the court should 
violate these principles in the name of public policy. 
 
62  While various policy objectives are pursued through our tax system, and 
do violate the principles of neutrality and equity, it is my view that such public policy 
determinations are better left to Parliament.  Particularly apposite is this Court’s 
statement in Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411, at 
para. 112, that “a legislative mandate is apt to be clearer than a rule whose precise 
bounds will become fixed only as a result of expensive and lengthy litigation”.  This 
statement was approved of by the Court in Canderel Ltd. V. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 
147, at para. 41, adding that “[t]he law of income tax is sufficiently complicated without 
unhelpful judicial incursions into the realm of lawmaking.  As a matter of policy, and out 
of respect for the proper role of the legislature, it is trite to say that the promulgation of 
new rules of tax law must be left to Parliament”. 
 
Judge Iacobucci also deemed it necessary to comment on the judgment of his co-
Judge Bastarache, who had recommended that the distinction between deductible 
and non-deductible levies had to be determined on a case by case basis.  Iacobucci 
J disagreed:49
 
 
In my view, such an approach would be quite onerous for the taxpayer who would be 
forced to undertake the difficult task of determining the object or purpose of the statute 
under which the payment was demanded whenever he or she filled out a tax return.  
Indeed, he or she would have to ascertain whether the specific purpose of the section was 
meant to be deterrence, punishment or compensation.  Moreover, difficulties and 
uncertainties would undoubtedly arise where the purpose of the statutory provision is 
mixed.  While a taxpayer must inevitably make various determinations in filing a return 
in order to report all relevant income and expenses and estimate the amount of tax 
payable, the statutory interpretation inquiry into the purpose of a statute is one which 
                                            
49 At paragraph 68 of the judgment. 
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even courts often find particularly challenging.  Consequently, it is inevitable that 
disputes will often require courts to determine whether a particular levy can be deducted 
from his or her income.  Undoubtedly, this would introduce a significant element of 
uncertainty into our self-reporting tax system.  On the other hand, Parliament could 
expressly prohibit the deduction of fines and penalties in a way compatible with the 
objectives of self-assessment and ease of administration. 
 
The judgment was concluded with an invitation to Parliament, formulated as 
follows: 50
 
 
To repeat, Parliament may well be motivated to respond promptly and comprehensively 
to prohibit clearly and directly the deduction of all such fines and penalties, if Parliament 
so chooses. 
 
This judgment was regarded as a “radical rewriting of Canadian tax law”51 and 
even gave rise to a petition addressed to the Auditor General of Canada and to the 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development.52
                                            
50 At paragraph 69 of the judgment, concluding sentence. 
  The petition 
related primarily to the deductibility of fines and penalties which were levied for 
violating environmental laws. It was contended that the tax deductibility of fines 
and penalties caused a serious reduction in the effectiveness of Canada’s 
environmental laws in deterring violations.  It was argued that the awareness of the 
deductibility of fines and penalties encouraged businessmen to regard them as the 
mere cost of doing business.  Shipping companies which had been fined for 
violating pollution provisions of the Canadian Shipping Act by spilling oil into the 
ocean apparently admitted that they had deducted large fines that were incurred in 
 
51 Vide:  Unnatural Law.  (December 3, 2003) Updates/Articles. http://unnaturallaw.com 
 
52 ibid. 
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respect of chemical releases which harmed both human health and the 
environment, from their business income.53
 
   
That the United States Supreme Court (which has a number of political appointees 
on its bench) was more readily inclined to raise public policy as a consideration 
which disqualified deductions, is evident from the decision already referred to 
above, namely Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue54.  
Tank Truck Rentals had paid several hundred fines imposed on it and its drivers 
for violations of state maximum weight laws.  The main issue revolved around the 
deductibility of those payments as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses.  
The United States Supreme Court inter alia held that a finding that an expense is 
“necessary” cannot be made if allowance of the deduction would “frustrate sharply 
defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct”55
                                            
53 ibid. 
, 
evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof.  The fines which the 
taxpayer had wanted to deduct related to contraventions of legislation of several 
states by penal statutes which were enacted to protect the highways of those states 
from damage and to ensure the safety of all persons using them.  A proviso was 
expressed, namely that the rule regarding the frustration of sharply defined national 
or state policies was not absolute.  The Supreme Court was of the view that each 
case had to turn on its own facts, and the test for non-deductibility was the severity 
and immediacy of the frustration resulting from the allowance of the deduction. 
The view was expressed that to permit the deduction of fines and penalties 
imposed by a state for violations of its laws, would frustrate state policy in a severe 
and direct fashion, by reducing the “sting” of the penalties.   
 
54 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
 
55 At paragraph 53 of Iacobucci J’s judgment. 
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In contrast, it should be pointed out that the same Supreme Court previously had 
no difficulty to confirm that profits which were generated illegally by a taxpayer 
constituted taxable income, even though the law might require such a taxpayer to 
repay the ill-gotten gains to the person from whom they had been taken.  This was 
exactly the effect of the judgment in James v United States, 366 U.S 213 (1961)56
 
.   
The Defendant, James, was an official in a labour union who had embezzled more 
than $738, 000 in union funds and did not report these amounts on his taxes.  He 
was tried for tax evasion and claimed in his defence that embezzled funds did not 
constitute taxable income because, like a loan, the taxpayer was legally obligated 
to return those funds to their rightful owner.  James argued that the Supreme Court 
of America had previously made such a determination in Commissioner v 
Wilcox.57
 
  The trial Court did not uphold this defence.  The pertinent issue which 
the United States Supreme Court had to decide upon was to determine whether 
embezzled funds constituted taxable income, even though an obligation to repay 
exists.   
The Court was divided between several different rationales.  The majority opinion 
was written by Chief Justice Warren.  His view was that if a taxpayer receives 
income, legally or illegally, without consensual recognition of an obligation to 
repay, such income is taxable.  The Court emphasised that the Sixteenth 
Amendment did not limit its scope to “lawful” income, a distinction which had 
been found in the 1913 Tax Act.  The removal of this distinction indicated that the 
framers of the Sixteenth Amendment had intended no safe harbour for illegal 
income.  The Court expressly overruled Commissioner v Wilcox, supra, and found 
                                            
56 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_v._United States.  
 
57 327 U.S. 404 (1946) 
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that James was therefore liable for the tax due on his embezzled funds.  However, 
the Court also found that James could not be held liable for the wilful tax evasion, 
because it was not possible to wilfully violate laws that were not established at the 
time of the violation.  James therefore succeeded to avoid a criminal sentence, but 
the effect of the majority opinion of the Court left James in a situation where he 
had to repay not only the embezzled $738, 000 to the union, but also had to pay 
over half a million dollars in taxes on those funds, as though he had been able to 
keep them.   
 
The effect of the judgment obviously operated in favour of the union and in favour 
of the United States Commissioner.  To contend that public policy principles or a 
blinkered, patriotic perception of an equitable outcome for the United States did 
not play a role in the judgment, would be as naïve a contention as to suggest that 
Iraq’s oil was irrelevant to President Bush when Saddam Hussein was toppled by 
invasion.  
 
The difficulty which one has with the American judgments is the lack of even-
handedness or consistency in respect of both the income/revenue side and the 
deduction side.  It is submitted that the correct application of the contra bonos 
mores principle, which has been well-developed in our common law, has nothing 
to do with the national or state policies of the day and everything to do with 
community convictions in the true sense of the word.  That constitutional 
principles (as embodied in an act, namely The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996) indubitably influence the present day mores of the 
community, must be conceded.58
                                            
58  In its modern guise, public policy is also rooted in the Constitution and the fundamental values  
 Political reasons, introduced under the guise of 
public policy, have to date fortunately not been allowed or sanctioned by our 
    enshrined therein:  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
 
70 
 
 
highest courts as constituting legitimate disqualifying factors.  Perhaps our courts 
should in future be especially careful not to raise or allow, for invalid reasons, so-
called public policy principles in the sphere of income tax, particularly in 
circumstances where our Commissioner non-moralistically seeks to tax income 
from illegal sources.59
 
  
A tax system should strive to be certain; consistent; neutral and largely non-
moralistic.  It is submitted that there is no reason why equity and even-handedness 
should not equally be striven for as legitimate goals.   If Courts intervene 
unnecessarily on the basis of public policy, this might well cause legal uncertainty, 
as it could be unclear what public policy specifically entailed.  It can be contended 
that once profits realised from an activity in the nature of a trade, albeit of an 
illegal nature, is taxed, then the expenditure and losses that were actually incurred 
in the production of such income should in principle be deductible.  This will then 
be consistent with legitimate tax policy goals such as neutrality and equity.60
 
  
There will certainly be claims for deductions which are so egregious or repulsive 
that to allow them, would obviously infringe upon public policy.  Whether non-
deductible claims should, however, be so narrowly described or categorised, is 
certainly debatable.   
Our own legal system has had little difficulty in dealing with the contra bonos 
mores concept in our law, particularly in the field of contract.   The concept has 
been applied by our courts in a very specific, circumscribed context.  Accordingly, 
                                            
59  As an example, the December 2006 edition of Noseweek, edited by Martin Welz, published by  
    Chaucer Publications (Pty) Ltd, reports that the South African Revenue Service has filed a claim of           
    R183.6 million against the estate of the late Brett Kebble.  The claim is reportedly based on an  
    estimation by SARS of what Kebble had earned over a 10-year period.  The proceeds inter alia relate  
    to the fraudulent sale of shares that had been misappropriated from two listed companies. 
 
60  In line with the Canadian approach set out by Iacobucci J in 65302 British Columbia v Canada,  
     supra, at paragraph 56 of the judgment. 
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it is submitted that its field of application has not detracted from legal certainty. 
Revenue law is not an independent part of our body of law and requires no special 
treatment.  Public policy principles will therefore continue to influence income tax 
issues in the same way that such principles will also continue to influence the law 
of delict, contract and criminal law. 
 
The same sentiments cannot be expressed in respect of the treatment by our courts 
of fault as a relevant consideration in decisions delivered during the first half of the 
past century, in particular.  In mitigation, it should immediately be stated that the 
influence of authoritative English decisions presumably played a much more 
persuasive role at the time of the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway and Joffe 
decisions, than in the modern day South Africa.  
  
Why fault was in any event brought into the equation in the factual context of the 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Limited decision61
                                            
61 Port Elizabeth Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241. 
, is unclear.  
Taxpayers are not faultless gods, but are either managed or operated by fallible 
human beings, or are in fact fallible human beings themselves, who make mistakes 
from time to time.  To disqualify expenditure actually and bona fide incurred or 
losses actually sustained, simply because the conduct of the taxpayer or the 
conduct of its employees or agents may with hindsight be adjudged as having been 
negligent in the circumstances, amounts to the introduction of an unnecessary and 
inappropriate criterion.  It could be argued that it is illogical to introduce the fault 
concept in the realm of revenue law.   Particularly in the light of the 
straightforward, matter-of-fact definition of “gross income”, it seems hardly 
appropriate that lack of concentration levels, forgetfulness or other deviations from 
the conduct of the reasonable man on the part of the taxpayer or its employees, 
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should result in the disallowance of a claim for a deduction of expenditure or loss 
actually incurred!  Startlingly, the learned Judge contradicts his earlier obiter 
comments further on in the judgment,62
 
 where he unequivocally acknowledges the 
fallibility of human nature: 
In this case, the potential liability is there all the time and is inseparable from the 
employment of drivers – that is to say, inseparable from the carrying on of the business.  
Moreover, it is a potential liability that is bound, human nature being what it is, to 
become at intervals in greater or lesser degree an actual liability by the occurrence of 
accidents….. 
 
It should be emphasised that the Joffe decision was largely decided in favour of 
the Commissioner by reason of an absence of evidence to prove that the negligence 
of the taxpayer, a company carrying on the business of reinforced concrete 
engineering, was a necessary concomitant of the income earning operations of a 
reinforced concrete engineer.  The Court suggested that, had there been such 
evidence, namely that the negligence which occurred during the construction of the 
cantilever hood and the ensuing liability for damages would from time to time be 
inevitable, the decision could well have gone the other way.  No doubt, this is 
ascribable to the fact that the matter was argued before the Court on a stated case 
basis.63
 
   
Notwithstanding the sentiments expressed by Judge Watermeyer regarding 
negligence or fault in the Port Elizabeth Tramway and Joffe decisions, Roper J 
convincingly showed in ITC 815, 20 SATC 487, that: 
                                            
62 On page 247 of the judgment. 
 
63 See page 165 of the Joffe decision:  “There is no suggestion in the stated case that negligence such  
    as  occurred when the cantilever hood was being constructed and the liability incurred thereby are the     
    inevitable concomitants of the business of a reinforced concrete engineer”. 
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[N]egligence in itself affords no reason why a loss caused by it should be held to be non-
deductible.  And there is no reason in principle why it should make any difference 
whether the negligence is that of employees or that of the taxpayer himself.  Negligence 
is an element of inefficiency, and an inefficient taxpayer is taxed upon the income which 
he actually earns and not upon that which he should have earned had he been efficient.   
Whether or not a loss caused by negligence would be deductible would depend upon the 
facts of the particular case and upon such matters as the nature and degree of the 
negligence and the character of the business. 
Roper J found in particular with respect to attorneys, that an attorney who goes into 
business with others is always subject to the risk that one of his partners may make 
a mistake of this kind and so involve him in loss. 
Williams and Louw in their joint publication, Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax 
in South Africa: Law and Practice,64
According to Williams, the reason why Watermeyer AJP honed in on the 
employment of drivers as the “act” in question rather than the driving of the tram, 
might have been that the judge wanted to skirt the problem of whether expenditure 
or loss which results from the commission of an unlawful act (the driving may well 
have been reckless or negligent) can be deductible.   Williams points out that the 
door to the deduction of expenditure arising from negligence was not entirely 
closed, as such expenditure would still be deductible if, firstly, it is a “necessary 
concomitant” of the particular trade or profession and secondly, where the 
taxpayer “has chosen to conduct his business in manner which necessarily leads to 
 criticize the “dubious” logic of 
Watermeyer AJP in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, for having 
distinguished between liability arising from the employment of drivers and the 
payment of legal costs.    
                                            
64 Williams, R.C. assisted by Louw, C (3rd Edition) Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax in South  
   Africa: Law and Practice. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths, page 334. 
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accident”.   Williams (on p 335) is not impressed by this logic, for the reasons 
stated above.   He states as follows, at p 335: 
The logic is less than persuasive.   Does the first proposition seriously suggest that there 
are some human activities, whether bricklaying or brain surgery, in which the possibility 
of negligence is not a necessary (by which is surely meant ‘inherent’) concomitant?  The 
second proposition is even less convincing.   It cannot seriously be suggested that 
damages caused by negligence are not tax-deductible for those who conduct their 
businesses responsibly but only for those who are wilfully indifferent to causing harm.   
In ITC 815 the decision in Joffe was explained away as having not laid down a principle 
but as being based on a lack of evidence as to the hazards of the taxpayer’s business. 
There is clearly merit in this criticism. 
The English decision in Bamford, supra65
                                            
65 See page 37 of this thesis.  
 has already been referred to. A 
comparable set of facts came before a Special Income Tax Court in [155] ITC 
1383 46 SATC 90.  The facts were as follows:  A was employed by a bank as 
secretary and staff manager, holding a fairly senior position in the taxpayer’s head 
office in Johannesburg.  It was discovered that by systematic defalcations, A had 
stolen a total amount of R 140 600.00 from the taxpayer over a period of time.  He 
had abused his authority to sign vouchers for the payment of salaries for members 
of staff in perpetrating the thefts.  His modus operandi was to sign vouchers 
creating false credit entries and withdraw the money.  With the assistance of two 
collaborators, the corresponding debits were kept in suspense, floating between 
head office and branches of the bank.  To a lesser extent, he stole money by 
making fictitious deposit entries into his own account and the accounts of two 
personal friends.  This matter was not heard on a stated case basis.  The general 
manager of the taxpayer bank did give evidence.  He testified that, in practice, the 
bank had no option but to rely on the integrity of its authorised signatories.  A had 
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sixteen years experience in banking and had come to the bank highly 
recommended.  There was furthermore no evidence that the thefts had been 
facilitated by any negligence on the part of the taxpayer.  The taxpayer’s loss was 
nonetheless initially not allowed as a deduction and came before Hill AJ in the 
Special Court.   
 
The representative of the Commissioner contended that no loss as a result of theft 
by an employee is deductible in the calculation of taxable income.  In the 
alternative, he argued that before any fortuitous loss can be deducted, the taxpayer 
must show that the risk of the mishap which gives rise to the loss must be 
inseparable from, or a necessary incident of the carrying on of the particular 
business.  Although it is not apparent from the judgment that the representative of 
the Commissioner had sought support in the Bamford decision, supra, it does 
appear that the representative of the Commissioner made a limited concession as 
part of his alternative argument, analogous to the Bamford scenario.  He contended 
that thefts by servants may be deductible, but should then be limited to thefts by 
junior employees of small amounts, to which he referred to as “run of the mill 
thefts”.  The Court could not find any logical reason for the concession to apply 
only to petty thefts by junior employees.  The Judge remarked as follows: 
 
Petty pilfering no doubt happens frequently in the course of business operations but thefts 
by senior employees are by no means rare occurrences and the risk of such thefts is, in 
my opinion, equally inseparable from or a necessary incident of the income-producing 
operations of a business.  Thefts of this type are usually well planned, difficult to detect 
and involve large amounts.66
 
 
                                            
66 At page 94. 
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The taxpayer was a commercial bank, which in the ordinary course of its business 
necessarily had to allow its employees to handle large sums of money.  However 
careful it could be expected to be in the selection and supervision of its staff, the 
risk of theft was an ever present factor in the administration of its business and was 
inseparable from it.  The appeal was accordingly allowed.   
 
Eloff AJP, in whose judgment Grosskopf J and Kirk-Cohen J concurred, held in 
KBI v Van der Walt 1986 (4) SA 303 (T) that the Port Elizabeth Electric  
 
Tramway Company Ltd case essentially postulates the bona fide test.67
 
   
In [180A] ITC 1600 58 SATC 31, Froneman J found that: 
 
(T)he answer, in my view, to the possible abuse of the deduction provisions in the 
Income Tax Act, lies in the requirement of bona fide expenditure set out in the Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramways case.  If the expenditure was not made bona fide in the 
normal course of business to produce income it cannot qualify as deductible expenditure. 
 
The acceptance or ratification of the bona fides of a taxpayer, which had incurred 
certain expenditure, is obviously not a decisive criterion.  The legal requirements 
for expenditure to constitute deductible expenditure, must still be satisfied.  
However, the bona fide criterion has certainly been used as a type of sieve or 
measuring tool by the courts.  The “characteristics of deductible expenditure” were 
                                            
67 At page 308, the learned Judge comments as follows:  “As ons dan, by toepassing van Watermeyer   
   WRP se woorde, dink aan nakoming van dienspligte eerder dan ‘business performance’ word daar nie   
   meer van die betrokkene geverg nie dan dat hy moet toon dat hy die betrokke uitgaaf bona fide   
   aangegaan het vir die meer  doeltreffende nakoming van sy dienspligte”. 
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summarised as follows by Conradie JA in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in 
Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, SARS 2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA):68
 
 
Deductible expenditure has certain characteristics:   it must be incurred in the production 
of income (s 11(a)) and will not be allowed as a deduction against gross income if it is 
not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade.  Up to and including the 1992 year of 
assessment such moneys must have been ‘wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for 
the purposes of trade’ (s 23(g)).  From the 1993 year of assessment onwards expenditure 
was not permitted as a deduction save ‘to the extent to which such moneys were…laid 
out or expended for the purposes of trade’. 
 
In Ticktin Timbers CC v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1999 (4) SA 939 (SCA) (1999 
(11) JTLR 29) at 942F-G Hefer JA called the purpose for which expenditure was 
incurred, ‘the decisive consideration in the application of 23(g)’.  He quoted the 
following passage from the judgment of Corbett JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1985 (4) SA 485 (A) at 500H-J: 
‘Generally, in deciding whether money outlayed by a taxpayer constitutes expenditure 
incurred in the production of income (in terms of the general deduction formula) 
important and sometimes overriding factors are the purpose of the expenditure and what 
the expenditure actually effects;  and in this regard the closeness of the connection 
between the expenditure and the income-earning operations must be assessed’. 
As to how close this connection must be, the Court in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Co v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1936 CPD 241 explained that 
‘….income is produced by the performance of a series of acts and attendant upon them 
are expenses.  Such expenses are deductible expenses provided that they are so closely 
linked to such acts as to be regarded as part of the cost of performing them….The 
purpose of the act entailing expenditure must be looked to.  If it is performed for the 
purpose of earning income, then the expenditure attendant upon it is deductible’. 
 
                                            
68 See page 350 of the judgment, paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. 
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A bona fide taxpaying company which spends money in order to advance the 
interests of a group of companies to which it belongs, will be unsuccessful in 
claiming such moneys as expenditure incurred in the production of income, 
because the link between the production of income and the expenditure is too 
tenuous.  Vide: Solaglass Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1991 (2) SA 257 (A).  Further, monies expended by a taxpayer from 
motives of pure liberality also fail to qualify as expenditure in the production of 
income.69
 
   
On the facts in the Warner Lambert matter, the Appellant had claimed certain 
expenditure incurred as part of a social responsibility programme that had cost a 
considerable amount of money.  The expenses claimed were those incurred in the 
furtherance of the Appellant’s social responsibility programme, which it had 
complied with by reason of the United States Sullivan Code.  The primary issue in 
the matter was whether the expenditure was incurred for a capital purpose, or for a 
revenue purpose.  Importantly, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the 
doctrine of dominant purpose only applies in the “capital versus revenue contest”, 
but was “inapplicable in any contest between expenditure for trade or for other 
purposes”.70  The Court found that whilst the link between the Appellant’s trade 
and the social responsibility expenditure was not particularly close and obvious, 
this does not mean that the connection was too remote.  The absence of a direct 
profit motive was also, in terms of earlier authority, not decisive. Conradie JA 
proceeded as follows:71
 
 
                                            
69 Vide:  Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd, supra, at page 351 E. 
 
70 See page 351 at I. 
 
71 At pages 352 – 353. 
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A loss of the appellant’s subsidiary status might have directly brought about the loss of 
all kinds of trade advantages.  It was unthinkable that the appellant should not comply 
with the Sullivan Code at all.  It was not certain what would become of it if it complied 
but failed to do so adequately;  but the appellant was not obliged, and if the truth be told 
would not have been permitted, to take the risk of finding out.  The Sullivan Code 
expenses were bona fide incurred72
 
 for the performance of the appellant’s income 
producing operation and formed part of the cost of performing it.  The social 
responsibility expenditure was therefore incurred for the purposes of trade and for no 
other.  
On the facts, the Court also found that the expenditure was sufficiently closely 
connected with the income earning operations of the Appellant that it could not be 
categorised as an expense of a capital nature.  Conradie JA made the interesting 
comment in this regard, that “(W)here no new asset (for the enduring benefit of the 
trading operation) has been created any questioned expenditure naturally tends to 
assume more of a revenue character”.73
 
 
It is apparent from this decision that a taxpayer which incurs expenditure, or 
suffers a loss as a result of expenditure incurred by reason of a liberality motive, or 
in order to advance the interest of a group of companies to which it belongs, will 
not be able to transform such expenditure into deductible expenditure merely 
because the expenditure or loss was bona fide incurred or sustained.  The legal 
characteristics or requirements as reiterated by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
above, should still be satisfied.  On the other hand, absence of a profit motive; 
imprudence or negligence will not per se disqualify the expenditure from being a 
permissible deduction.  
 
                                            
72 Own emphasis. 
 
73 At page 353 at E. 
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In the context of this research, not much turns on the different interpretations 
which could be given to the words “expenditure” and “losses”.  Generally the word 
“expenditure” has not caused problems of interpretation, although some doubt 
seemingly surrounds the interpretation to be given to the concept “loss”.  The  
correct approach appears to be that expenditure signifies an outgoing resulting 
from a voluntary action on the part of the taxpayer, whereas a loss is an 
involuntary outgoing. 74
 
  However, the concept of fides may perhaps also be useful 
in this regard:  a loss which is deliberately caused, would hardly have been 
sustained bona fide.  A voluntarily sustained loss, which implies a deliberate act, is 
hardly reconcilable with the conduct of a bona fide person.  A contrarii, an 
involuntary outgoing caused by negligence cannot be equated with an absence of 
bona fides, for the simple reason that people who make mistakes might have done 
so whilst acting entirely bona fide.   
The presence (or absence) of bona fides was also usefully applied as part of the 
“screening test”, some years ago,  in the context of allegedly excessive expenditure 
in the Southern Rhodesian decision of Tobacco Father v Commissioner of Taxes 
1951 (1) 150 (SR).  The Appellant in this matter was a trader and tobacco grower 
in the tobacco district.  His son, Prospero (the father obviously had high aspirations 
for him) grew up on the tobacco farm.  Prospero became interested in tobacco 
farming when he was a young boy.  After leaving school at the age of 17 years, he 
was employed by his father, the Appellant, to manage two of the tobacco farms.  
The business literally prospered.  It should therefore have come as little surprise 
that the father, (who must by then have been convinced that he had christened his 
son very aptly) had decided to reward Prospero more than adequately.  The 
remuneration that had been agreed upon for the services of Prospero was a bonus 
                                            
74 Vide:  Joffe & Company Limited v CIR 1946 (AD) 157;   
              
             Stone v SIR 1974 (3) SA 584 (A). 
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equivalent to 27 ½ % of the net profits of the tobacco grown during the particular 
season, in addition to free board and lodging.  The Commissioner of Taxes was 
unimpressed with Prospero’s remuneration, despite the productiveness of the father 
and son.  It was his case that the bonus payment was not in fact a bona fide 
payment for services, or alternatively, that if the payment was bona fide, it was 
excessive.   
 
Beadle J was impressed by the father and son as being candid and honest 
witnesses.  In dealing with the Commissioner’s first ground that the payment was 
not bona fide, which contention was rejected, he held that their evidence had 
persuaded him that ordinary business considerations of remuneration for services 
rendered applied at the time when they had entered into the agreement.  Judge 
Beadle found that the agreement between the Appellant and his son was an 
ordinary commercial transaction and that the payment constituted a bona fide 
payment arising from a bona fide contract.  The fact that the son had produced a 
“very fine tobacco crop which the returns show was of a better quality than the 
crop grown the previous year when the appellant himself and other servants were 
in charge of the farm” also played no minor role in persuading the judge to arrive 
at this finding.  With respect to the alternative argument, that even if the payment 
might have been bona fide, it was excessive, Beadle J (whose salary was probably 
not that impressive) commented as follows: 
  
Now, I may say right away that on reading the papers it is easy to understand the 
Commissioner’s attitude in this case.  It does produce, to say the least of it, a sense of 
surprise that a youth of the age of 17 could earn a salary of something approximating 
£2,000 in the first year after he left school, and it is easy to understand why the 
Commissioner adopted the attitude he did in this particular case.  But it seems to me, 
however much surprised we might be to think that a youth of his age could earn such 
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large amount in his first year after leaving school, that it is not sufficient to justify the 
Commissioner in not allowing the deduction. 
 
The father succeeded.  No doubt, he and Prospero prospered even more after this 
finding in their favour.   
 
A payment which was not made in good faith, or which was so excessive that it 
could not objectively be regarded as having been made bona fide, would in all 
likelihood have resulted in a different outcome.  What is particularly relevant to 
this thesis, is the fact that the Court was at pains to ensure that moralistic standards 
or the views of members of the community did not unnecessarily cloud the real 
issue.  In addition to the comments quoted above, Beadle J remarked in this regard 
as follows: 75
 
 
The industry offers very high inducements indeed for competent tobacco farm managers, 
because even if bonuses as high as 30, 40 or 50 per cent of the nett profits of the crop are 
paid, the remaining profits which accrue to the owner are still sufficiently high to make it 
well worth his while to offer these high wages.  That being so, I feel that while to the 
ordinary man in the street and judge without reference to the tobacco industry this rate of 
remuneration certainly appears to be excessive and grossly extravagant, when this wage 
is measured against the wages prevailing in the tobacco industry to-day, I do not think 
that it can be held to be excessive.   
 
Satisfied with the bona fides of the Appellant and his son, objective facts 
accordingly persuaded the judge - not moralistic, subjective armchair views of the 
public.   
 
                                            
75 At page 153 at A – C. 
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By 1965, Beadle J had become Beadle CJ as he was now the Chief Justice.  It was 
in this capacity that he delivered the judgment of the Southern Rhodesian Appeal 
Court in COT v Rendle 1965 (1) SA 59 (SRAD), 26 SATC 326.  On the facts, the 
Appellant had practised as a chartered accountant whose firm had been retained by 
two property-owning companies which had sold certain properties on instalments.  
Certain moneys which had been paid in by purchasers had not been banked.  After 
an investigation was conducted which had cost a substantial amount, it appeared 
that an employee had misappropriated various amounts.  After referring to various 
judgments of the Appellate Division, inter alia, CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd,76
   
 
Beadle J postulated the standard test as follows: 
All expenses attached to the performance of a business operation bona fide performed for 
the purpose of earning income are deductible whether such expenses are necessary for its 
performance or attached to it by chance or are bona fide incurred for the more efficient 
performance of such operation provided they are so closely connected with it that it 
would be proper, natural or reasonable to regard the expenses as part of the cost of 
performing the operation. 
 
Satisfied with the bona fides of the taxpaying company, which was the Appellant 
before him, he held that the risk of the “mishap” giving rise to the expenditure was 
sufficiently closely connected with the taxpayer’s business operation, as to be 
regarded as part of the cost of conducting the business operation.  He found that 
there was no reason in principle why this test could not be applied to theft by an 
employee, as well as to theft by a third party.   
 
Quite correctly, negligence did not disqualify the deductibility of a loss in the 
matter of X v COT 1960 (2) SA 679 (SR).  The Appellant was a firm of attorneys 
which was instructed to sell certain municipal stock on behalf of a deceased estate.  
                                            
76 1955 (3) SA 293 (A) at 299. 
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The stock was delivered to the firm and in due course, sold through a member of 
the local stock exchange.  Through the negligence of an employee of the taxpayer, 
the scrip together with the duly completed transfer forms, were delivered to the 
stock exchange member before payment of the purchase price had been made to 
the taxpayer’s firm.  The stockbroker misappropriated the purchase price, thus 
committing theft.  It was clear that the conduct of the firm of attorneys was 
tantamount to negligence, the negligent act having been the delivery of the scrip in 
a negotiable format without obtaining payment or its equivalent simultaneously or 
beforehand.  If the correct and normal procedure had been followed, there would 
undoubtedly have been no risk of loss.   
 
If fault or the convictions of the community had been regarded as material 
considerations, the taxpayer might not have succeeded with the appeal.  However, 
the foreseeable possibility of negligence on the part of the attorneys working for 
the taxpayer was acknowledged.  It was remarked by the Court that whilst such 
losses were of rare occurrence, it was inevitable that from time to time, an 
incautious step in the course of a transaction would result in a loss.   MacDonald J 
went even further:77
 
  
 After careful consideration I am satisfied that there is no reason for distinguishing in law  
between such a loss and similar losses suffered in other walks of life.  Where, as in this 
case, a loss arises directly out of a particular operation carried on for the purpose of gain 
the claim to deduct it is stronger prima facie than where the loss is not directly or closely 
linked with such an operation. 
 
The emphasis in the aforementioned regard could also have been placed on bona 
fides.  If the loss was sustained whilst a legitimate operation or trade was being 
                                            
77 On page 681. 
85 
 
 
pursued in order to generate profit, or, as the court had put it, “for the purpose of 
gain”, the loss would have been sustained in bona fide circumstances.  The 
pursuance of a profit motive is not essential (as has been shown above).  An 
assessment whether the taxpayer was negligent in the process, clouds the inquiry 
whether the language of the Act and the relevant legal requirements have been 
met.  The decision in X v COT (supra) is noteworthy by reason of the apparent 
logic of the Judge in dismissing the negligence aspect as a possible disqualifying 
influence. 
 
4.3 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
It was shown in the preceding chapter, chapter four, that the Act does not indicate 
expressly that these considerations or values are relevant to the question whether 
expenditures incurred are deductible from taxpayers’ gross income.  However, it 
has been demonstrated in this chapter that the courts have on numerous occasions 
treated these considerations as relevant factors whilst applying the “screening” test.  
Is this casuistic development a positive and welcome development, or does it 
create legal uncertainty?  This question is addressed in the next, concluding 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In the realm of South African income tax law, it is well-known that sections 11(a) 
and 23(g) of the Income Tax Act constitute the so-called general deduction 
formula. Whether or not expenditure or losses incurred are deductible from a 
taxpayer’s income necessitates an assessment of the question whether the losses or 
expenditure satisfy the legal elements contained in these two subsections.  On face 
value, one might expect that concepts such as mores, fault and fides would have no 
place in the assessment process, to determine whether the particular expenditure or 
loss should qualify as a deduction.  However, in evaluating the conduct of 
taxpayers in this regard, these considerations have often been treated as relevant 
considerations by the Courts.  The negligence of taxpayers in the conduct of their 
income generating operations has contributed to the disallowance of expenditure or 
losses claimed by them.  Community convictions or public policy have also been 
regarded as relevant considerations, whether deliberately or as part of the 
motivation of particular judgments. Fides or good faith has also been treated as a 
relevant consideration, particularly in circumstances where the deductions that 
were claimed fell in a grey area. 
 
The goal of the research was to establish whether or not mores, fault or fides are 
acceptable criteria to be applied when granting income tax deductions. In 
achieving this goal, the thesis first discussed the need to cast the tax net as widely 
as possible in order to generate the tax revenue needed to meet the socio-economic 
obligations of the government.  This appeared to indicate that these considerations 
should not be used to exclude income from “gross income” as defined in the 
Income Tax Act, but left open the question whether the deduction of expenses 
incurred in producing the income should be restricted by the considerations. 
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The lack of specific indicators in the Act itself regarding the relevance or 
irrelevance of these concepts was also considered.  With the exception of section 
23(o) of the Income Tax Act, which prohibits the deduction of expenditure in 
relation to an activity contemplated in the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act, 12 of 2004, or fines or penalties imposed as a result of unlawful 
activities, the Act does not contain any specific indicators relating to the relevance 
of fault, mores or fides in granting deductions or allowances. 
 
5.1 
 
FAULT AS A CONSIDERATION 
Fault (dolus and culpa), fides and mores (community convictions) have over the 
years often been regarded as relevant considerations by the courts in the process of 
deciding whether expenditure or losses should be allowed as deductions or not.  
Whilst the presence of dolus (direct intent) on the part of the taxpayer when a loss 
is sustained, might be indicative of an absence or want of good faith, the same 
cannot be said of culpa (negligence).  Such an inference would be unwarranted  in 
circumstances where the taxpayer’s negligence had contributed to the loss, as has 
been shown. 
 
However, there is little difficulty in asserting that a taxpayer should not be allowed 
to deduct an alleged loss as a deduction, if such a loss was intentionally caused. At 
common law, a Plaintiff who was merely part author of his own loss by reason of 
negligence could recover nothing at all.78
                                            
78 See:  Boberg, P.Q.R. (Volume 1, revised reprint 1989)  The Law of Delict.  Cape Town:  Juta &   
  On the one hand, the disqualification 
when intention (dolus) is involved, may be premised on the fact that such a loss 
would not have been involuntarily incurred and would thus not constitute a loss, if 
the voluntary or involuntary nature of the conduct constitutes a valid criterion.  
             Company Ltd.  This principle was ameliorated to some extent, by the development of the  
             somewhat  superficial “last opportunity”-rule. 
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However, the presence of direct intent or dolus may be an irrelevant and 
impractical measuring device, particularly if the deductibility of expenditure other 
than (a) loss(es) is at stake. 
 
5.2 
 
COMMUNITY CONVICTIONS AS A CONSIDERATION 
Community convictions or the boni mores of society are well-known concepts in 
our law.  A contract to reward a person for murdering or assaulting someone is 
contra bonos mores.  Corruptive practices or conduct induced by fraudulent 
motives, are also contra bonos mores.  Damages intentionally caused by one 
person, resulting in a loss to such person’s patrimony, do not give rise to a legally 
enforceable cause of action. The determination of the limits or parameters of 
conduct or actions which are reconcilable with the convictions of the community 
may change, as the views and norms of society change.  This is so, because 
normative values in society are not static or constant, but dynamic.   
 
The disqualification of a loss or expenditure actually incurred, could also be 
premised on community convictions – it might be contended that any loss 
deliberately caused should not be allowed as a deduction, because the allowance of 
such a loss as a deduction would be in conflict with the convictions of the 
community.  As was shown in the previous chapter, courts in Canada have, 
however, emphasised the resultant difficulty experienced by taxpayers in particular 
situations, when they have to determine what public policy actually entailed.  To 
unnecessarily introduce public policy principles, especially for political or 
“national” reasons (which has happened in the United States of America, as 
previously demonstrated), might give rise to legal uncertainty. This foreseeable 
consequence of legal uncertainty, therefore calls for judicial caution.  
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Our law has developed progressively over the last number of years and the ambit 
of the boni mores has been clarified. Constitutional principles now have a direct 
bearing on the mores of the community.  The Constitution constitutes the “supreme 
law”, and the Act itself is also subordinate to the Constitution.79
 
 
5.3 
 
GOOD FAITH AS A CONSIDERATION 
It is submitted that the bona fide criterion may indeed be useful in evaluating 
whether expenditure or losses actually incurred should be allowed as a deduction.  
The criterion should (at least as far as is possible) be objectively applied. An 
absence of good faith – objectively and not (more problematically) subjectively 
assessed - might also indicate that the expenditure was not incurred “in the 
production of income”, or might even impact on community convictions.  The law 
(the formal body of norms subscribed to by the community) disapproves of such an 
absence of good faith – objectively assessed – as it is a reflection of the taxpayer’s 
state of mind.  The disapproval by law arises from the fact that the community 
which applies or adheres to the law, regards such conduct as unreasonable or even 
reprehensible.   
 
The assessment of intention (dolus) almost invariably necessitates the application 
of a subjective test:  what is the state of mind or directing will of the person 
concerned?  Particularly in the field of revenue law, this is a problematic inquiry – 
one merely has to refer to the vast number of cases dealing with the revenue versus 
capital test in which the taxpayer’s intention had to be determined. 
 
                                            
79 Section 2 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 provides as follows:    
    “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic;  law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and  
    the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”. 
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Would the application or use of the bona fide criterion be less problematic or not?  
Does it not also call for a partly subjective test?  Both a “yes and no” answer can 
be suggested.  If the emphasis is placed on actual outward manifestations, or on the 
conduct of the taxpayer concerned and not on the taxpayer’s own ipse dixit or 
subjective explanations, the application of the bona fide test should be less 
problematic than the test to determine the taxpayer’s true intention.  The 
circumstances in which the expenditure was incurred, or the way in which the 
expenditure was incurred, or the manner in which the loss was sustained, might be 
such that the inference may (or will) arise that the taxpayer’s conduct was not bona 
fide.  An objective assessment, instead of a subjective inquiry, is accordingly 
suggested, to ensure the meaningful and practical use of the fides-criterion.  It is 
not suggested that evidence from the taxpayer regarding his alleged intention or 
motive should be regarded as entirely irrelevant. The evaluating Court should 
however, not conduct the evaluation from the point of departure that the 
determination of the taxpayer’s fides necessarily requires an investigation into the 
taxpayer’s mindset.  The facts or external conduct might well speak adequately for 
themselves. 
 
5.4 
 
CONCLUSION 
That the courts have, deliberately or incidentally, en passant or (apparently) as part 
of ratio decidendi, sensibly, logically and helpfully (to the readers of judgments) 
used the fides criterion, is a development to be welcomed.  That fault, especially 
the negligence of taxpayers, has rationally been relegated to a largely irrelevant 
consideration in this context, was to be expected.  It is submitted that this logical 
development has contributed to legal certainty. 
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Contra bonos mores conduct, or actions which offend against the convictions of 
the community, have consistently been disapproved of in our law.  Indeed, the 
mores of the community constitutes a legal boundary. That the determination of the 
communi mores might at times be problematic, does not detract from the validity 
of this “limiting” consideration. Implications or sanctions follow if this threshold is 
crossed. Its continued application in our law, particularly in the Constitutional era 
where our Constitution has further supplemented and in some instances, 
superseded common law normative values, is not only welcome, but necessary.  
This normative limitation correctly applied, it is submitted, does not detract from 
legal certainty. To the contrary, the continued application of this criterion or 
yardstick is necessary and contributes to the maintenance of a civilized society 
which has subordinated itself to the rule of law. 
 
As long as an even-handed approach is applied on both the accrual/receipt side and 
the deduction (expenditure/loss) side, in applying the fides and mores criteria, 
taxpayers should not have too much to complain about.  Notwithstanding earlier 
sentiments which were expressed that there is no equity about tax, it is submitted 
that equity and neutrality should be legitimate goals of our South African tax 
system.  The mere fact that deductions are claimed in respect of an immoral or 
prima facie illegal activity, should not ipso facto or ipso iure result in the 
disallowance of such expenditure:  it would be inconsistent with the neutrality 
objective to tax income from an immoral or prima facie illegal source on an non-
moralistic basis, yet to moralistically deny actually incurred deductions in respect 
of the selfsame activity.  Admittedly, the very nature of the deduction claimed 
might be such that to allow the deduction would be contra bonos mores.  The 
communi mores consideration should however, not be misused for political or 
“nationalistic” reasons. 
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What is the concluding assessment of the relevance of these considerations in the 
context of the admissibility of expenditure and losses claimed as deductions?  
Culpa has rightfully passed away; mores will remain (perhaps as a less mystic 
criterion than during the pre-Constitutional era) and fides should prosper as a 
useful criterion. 
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